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Common sense recognizes a place for the coarse-grained belief-like attitudes of belief,
disbelief and suspension of belief. It also recognizes a space for fine-grained attitudes like
confidence. This thesis sees the former kind grounded in the latter: The coarse-grained
attitudes stand to the finer-grained attitudes of simple confidence, confidence that is
essentially vague, like determinates and determinable respectively. They are in turn
grounded in the even more metaphysically basic cognitive forces of attraction, repulsion
and neutrality. I examine the main approaches to the relationship between the attitudes,
and dismiss belief-first views, dualist views, and eliminativism about belief or confidence.
I masteravhandlingen har jeg undersøkt relasjonen mellom v̊are trosoppfatninger som
forst̊att kategorisk, slik tradisjonell epistemologi ser det, og som et gradert fenomen,
slik formell epistemologi anser dem. Jeg argumenterer for at v̊ar kategoriske oppfatning
av trosoppfatninger kan reduseres til den graderte via sikkerhet (confidence). Videre
springer v̊are trosoppfatninger fra enda mer metafysisk fundamentale krefter; tiltrekning,
frastøting og nøytralitet. Jeg tar for meg teorier av relasjonen som eksisterer mellom
graderte og kategoriske trosoppfatninger, og viser at dualisme, eliminativisme, og å red-
usere den graderte modellen for trosoppfatninger til den kategoriske ikke lykkes.
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An important debate in contemporary epistemology is on the nature of belief, and on the
relationship between the attitudes of belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief, and the
attitudes of credence and its relatives such as confidence (Jackson, 2020). On one side of
the debate, you find epistemologists who hold that ‘belief’ is a categorical affair (see e.g.
Easwaran, 2016; Holton, 2008; Horgan, 2017; Moon, 2017). On the other, you have those
that take ‘belief’ to be an attitude that comes in degrees, often represented by credence
(see e.g. Jeffrey, 1970; Pettigrew, 2016). Some take one notion to reduce to the other
and still others take the position that these phenomena both refer, do not reduce, and
are equally metaphysically fundamental. That is to say that we have two epistemic tools
that both do philosophical work, that are fully independent of each other (Jackson, 2020;
Moon & Jackson, 2020).
I will defend the position that what answers to ‘full belief’ or simply ‘belief’ is a special
case of a claim (or mental state with propositional content) for which an agent’s confidence
is high, approaching certainty; there is no belief simpliciter in its traditional guises1.
Human persons have the belief-like attitudes of confidences2, which admit of degrees, but
do not embody absolute mathematical precision. Belief reduces to confidence above a
vague threshold, disbelief to confidences below a vague threshold, and suspended belief
to sufficiently thick confidence3. Our confidences are in turn grounded in mixtures of the
more metaphysically fundamental cognitive forces of attraction, repulsion, and neutrality
(see Sturgeon, 2020).
There are two main projects in the debate on belief. The first is concerned with the
metaphysics of belief, and its aims are mainly descriptive: What is belief, and what sort
of states or attitudes populates our psychological ontology? What do we mean when
we say that someone believes X more strongly than Y, or someone simply believes that
1Similarly, there is no disbelief or suspended belief as we normally treat them in epistemology.
2Throughout, I will reserve ‘credence’ for a specific conception of degreed belief that is both absolutely
and infinitely precise, and let ‘simple confidence’ range over degreed belief-like attitudes that lack this
precision. The counterpart degreed notions of ‘suspended belief’ and ‘disbelief’ is thick confidences,
and weak confidences. I will also talk simply of ‘belief’ and ‘believings’ which is to be understood as





P? The second is concerned with normative dimensions: Which configurations of belief-
like attitudes is it rational to hold, and what are the markers of rational belief? While
these projects are rarely entirely insular, a substantial proportion of the literature on
the relationship between belief and credence falls squarely in this second category. It
is mostly divorced from psychological considerations, and treat credence and beliefs as
epistemic attitudes that are mainly of interest because they are the sort of attitudes that
are claimed to be subject to various epistemic norms4.
The nature of belief is central to debates about rationality and the sorts of rational con-
straints on belief we take there to be (see e.g. Christensen, 2004; Hájek & Lin, 2017;
Staffel, 2020; Sturgeon, 2020). As we will see, different models of belief render different
verdicts on the sort of rational constraints that these belief-like attitudes may be subject
to. Furthermore, the relationship the attitudes bear to the familiar epistemological no-
tions of justification, knowledge, and so on — while not the subject of this thesis — will
to a varying extent be affected by how ‘belief’ is conceptualized. Epistemic analyses will
look quite different if we take the fundamental epistemic attitude to be credence rather
than belief. The nature of belief and of the relationship between belief and credence
therefore have important ramifications for several areas of epistemology in particular,
and philosophy in general.
While questions about the nature of epistemic normativity are important, they are not my
main concern in this thesis. Attitudes such as ‘confidence’ (lent to a claim), and ‘belief’,
are the sorts of attitudes that human persons have and recognize as features of their
mental lives; we have strong prima facie evidence for their existence in our psychological
make-up. The degree to which ‘credences’ map onto attitudes like these more familiar
ones, or vice versa is under debate. For the categorical view of belief, we resort to
attitudes that are absolutely accurate, they report an agent as believing in all and only
those instances she is in fact believing. This model does not recognize that our beliefs
appear to come in different degrees of strength; we believe some things more strongly than
others. Those that take a degreed view employ attitudes that are maximally specific5.,
they can report even the most minuscule differences in the confidence we lend to claims.
They are not accurate, however; while we may believe some P more strongly than Q,
we cannot state with unit-real precision the degree to which we believe either (Rinard,
2017).
There is a discrepancy between the specificity embodied by the idealized attitude of
credence and the specificity had by our actual attitudes. What there is less agreement
4Often norms of rationality.
5A representation is accurate only insofar as an agent really is as she is represented i.e., described as
believing p iff she is in fact believing p. A representation is specific ‘[...] insofar as it is committal about
whether P, for propositions P about the agent’s doxastic state’ (Rinard, 2017, p.258).
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about is the degree to which this idealization vitiates the project of working out what the
norms of rationality are: If we work out the norms of rationality employing models that
embody idealization of attitudes such that they bear no resemblance to attitudes had by
human persons, then it is unclear what normative force the requirements on rationality
carry for us (Christensen, 2004, pp.143-146). Furthermore, there is widespread agreement
that credence is an idealization, not necessarily a psychologically real kind. As such, it is
unclear if it is fit for purpose when describing our actual attitudes.
With this debate as backdrop, I will let comfort of fit within the psychology of human
persons and within our practices involving epistemic attitudes be the yardstick against
which my view of belief will be measured. Human persons, actual epistemic agents, likely
cannot take the attitude of credence towards a claim. Credence is an attitude that only
ideal epistemic agents can take. As a consequence, most models of degreed belief do not
describe the doxastic affairs of actual epistemic agents well. We do however take some
attitude towards claims that is of finer grain than outright belief, as we are happy to
state our confidence in various claims that we nonetheless believe. This I will argue is
because we take an attitude of simple confidence.
Mine is a descriptive project, and my view is undergirded by plausible metaphysical as-
sumptions about our psychology. Normative facts about how we ought to believe — how
our believings should be structured to count as rational — are not of secondary import-
ance, but they are secondary to our interests in working out the metaphysics of belief. If
a confidence-view of our believings is psychologically feasible, is ultimately an empirical
question. The jury on the state of play of belief-like attitudes in our ‘psyontology’ is still
out (see Weisberg, 2020)6. I am therefore putting forward a view of belief that enjoys
many of the good-making features had by formal models of degreed belief, while avoiding
some of their idealizations. As my view shuns the mathematical and computational per-
fection that most formal models demand of agents who have the attitudes of credence, it
will not, as a result, fit comfortably in the canonical normative schemes of either full or
degreed belief.
1.1 Looking ahead.
In chapter 2. I will be looking at metaphysical and methodological assumptions I will be
making for the chapters that follow. We will look at functional rôles ascribed to belief.
My view sees belief primarily as a function of interaction with the epistemic reasons, i.e.,
6Weisberg (2020) argues that psychological research suggests that we have full beliefs and degreed beliefs,
and that these serve different rôles in reasoning, suggesting a dualist ontology of belief and credence.
It is not clear however that the research is incompatible with the view that what we call full belief is
actually a determinate of degreed belief.
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evidence we have for or against the truth of a given claim, but others see the functional
role of belief primarily as aiming at truth, or at directing or producing behaviour. I will
draw up distinctions between actual epistemic agents and ideal epistemic agents, and
rationally held belief and belief as such. This will be important for our purposes when
discussing and dismissing belief-first, dualist and eliminativist views of belief. Since mine
is a reductive view of our believeings, and since discussions of which notions of ‘reduction’
are in play rarely crop up in the literature (Jackson, 2020), a brief note on that is in order.
Chapter 3. will address the belief-like, or epistemic attitudes. We will take an in-depth
look at credence, because it is an attitude that at the same time has been put to re-
markable theoretical work, and one that comes with serious theoretical commitments.
A Tinkertoy case will exhibit not only features had by credence, but the attractions of
the epistemological project of probabilism more generally. At a first pass; if one’s set of
credences is probabilistically coherent, then one is said to be in an epistemically better
position no matter how the world turns out than if one is holding a set that is not coher-
ent. One is not holding what is called a dominated set of credences (see e.g. Easwaran,
2011, 2015; Pettigrew, 2013a, 2016).
Chapter 4. will address a puzzle that arises when the belief-like attitudes of the coarse and
fine-grained attitudinal spaces are examined together with the norms taken to determine
which configuration of attitudes it is rational to hold. The Preface paradox and the
Lottery paradox are prominent among arguments that purport to show that one cannot
reconcile coarse-grained, fine-grained, and threshold views of belief without ending up
with irrational configurations of believings. The puzzle, at root, is to sort out the least
painful way to square the metaphysics of the belief-like attitudes with the epistemic norms
thought to operate on them. This balancing act is a through-line and motivating factor
for much of the literature on belief.
The main reactions to the puzzle are dualism about belief and credence, and eliminativism
about one of the attitudes. Having introduced the belief-like attitudes, assumptions about
our psychology, and the tensions that arise when our attitudes are subjected to norms,
we will go on to address theories of the relationship between the coarse-grained and the
fine-grained attitudes.
We are presented with two attitudinal spaces, one of coarse-grained attitudes, and one
of fine-grained attitudes. Full belief, along with disbelief and suspension of belief, are
what Sturgeon (2020, pp.1-5) calls coarse-grained attitudes. These are the psychological
phenomena that are given the most attention by those epistemologists working in what
has been labelled ‘traditional epistemology’. ‘Partial belief’, ‘credences’ and ‘degrees of
belief’, at a first pass conceived of as the subjective probabilities one assigns to a claim
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that something is the case, has for the most part been the domain of what has come to
be known as formal or Bayesian epistemology7. ‘Simple confidence’ is an attitude that
is degreed, but one that does not embody real-valued precision as credence does. We are
presented, roughly, with two questions (Sturgeon, 2020, p.221):
1. How do elements within the coarse- and fine-grained attitudinal spaces relate to
each other?
2. How do elements of one attitudinal space relate to elements of the other?
The first question is concerned with questions such as if belief is more fundamental than
disbelief or suspension of belief, or if there exists any relations between credence 1 and
the infinitely many other credences one might take. The second question, and our main
concern, is how the elements of these attitudinal spaces relate to each other across the
spaces.
We will begin by addressing the eliminativist question: Common sense may recognize
both coarse and fine-grained attitudes, but does ‘belief’, ‘credence’ and their relatives
really refer? We will then tackle the dualist question: Under an assumption that they
both refer, are they self-standing epistemic attitudes? I will go on to discuss desiderata
for a model of belief: If eliminativism and dualism are not successful, that leaves reductive
theories that places metaphysical priority on one attitude over the other. What ought
such a model to look like?
Following chapters will deal with the reduction question. If ‘belief’ and ‘credence’ both
refer and dualism is unsuccessful, how do the attitudes of one attitudinal space relate to
the other? There are two main strands of theories of this relationship, one that puts belief
and its coarse-grained relatives first, and seeks to reduce credence to belief. The other
places credence first, and seeks to reduce belief to species of credence. Those that seek to
ground belief in credence are called credence-first, belief-as-credence, or fine views, and
those that seek to ground credence in belief are called credence-as-belief, belief-first or
coarse views (see, e.g. Easwaran, 2015; Jackson, 2020; Leitgeb, 2017; Moon & Jackson,
2020; Sturgeon, 2020). These are the subjects of chapter 6. and 7. respectively.
In chapter 8. I will introduce my own account of belief. It is sympathetic to belief-
as-credence approaches: Full belief is grounded in degreed belief. However, it does not
recognize their idealization of our attitudes. It is to a large extent inspired by Sturgeon’s
(2020) view that ‘belief’ is confidence above a contextually variable threshold8. It is also a
7There is of course also formal models for full belief, which has received attention by both camps
(Easwaran, 2015)
8Much like some argue that our knowledge-attributions are in part sensitive to contextual features
(Rysiew, 2021) - such as practical stakes for us in the truth of some claim p - some argue that the
threshold for belief is also sensitive to stakes in this way (Sturgeon, 2020). When the stakes are low, so
too is the threshold for belief.
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critique of his view: He claims that cognitive forces can make for attitudes with the real-
and interval-valued precision of credence and credal sets. While these attitudes model
well, they are attitudes that human persons likely cannot take. I am therefore putting
forward an alternative explanation of how we rationalize a take on things in ‘credal-
making’ situations; situations in which we have the evidential grounds to plausibly take
an attitude of credence, but where I take it that we fail to do so. As I am critiquing
Sturgeon’s work, the details of, and motivations for, his theory will figure prominently in
both arguments and exposition throughout this thesis.
My view comes with a significant theoretical cost. Not in the domain of the metaphysics
of belief-like attitudes, but in the domain of rationality. In chapter 9. I will show how
my view fits uneasily within the canonical normative schemes of full and degreed belief,
and discuss two objections to a simple-confidence account of belief. ‘Simple confidence’
does not seem to be the sort of attitude that can be subject to the deductive constraints
of closure and consistency, nor probabilistic coherence in any straightforward way. These
are the standard synchronic norms on rational belief for coarse-grained and fine-grained
epistemic attitudes respectively9. This is in effect to show that my view — while a more
accurate representation of ‘belief’ as such — costs its ‘defects’ as it were, to theories of
rationality of full and credal believings.
9I say ‘standard’ not because they are the only ones, but because these are the norms most often
under discussion (see Leitgeb, 2017). There are also diachronic norms, such as various notions of
conditionalization.
2 The rôles of belief
We will begin by probing our intuitions about belief and degreed belief. I will then be
stating some assumptions about the workings of the mind, because these are what my
concept of belief is built upon. We will also see what sort of functional rôles belief has been
thought to play in our mental lives. The different rôles are closely tied to our conceptions
of belief-like attitudes, and underwrites different views of them. Much discussion turns
on which functional role we ascribe to belief, where some arguments succeed if one role is
treated as more fundamental than the others, and fails if not, as we shall see (Wedgwood,
2012).
2.1 Of coins and credence.
In advance of a full argument for the case that ‘outright belief’ is a special case of a
mental state with propositional content invested with high confidence, I will prime our
intuitions, as it were. Two examples will show that our believings come in degrees of
confidence, but that these degrees of confidence are not precise. They can be representable
by real numbers, but they will then be absolutely precise estimates of the vague degree
of confidence we lend to some claim, which as we will see is problematic. Take a look at
the following list of propositions:
1. Paris is the capital of France
2. Brussels is the capital of Belgium
3. Wellington is the capital of New Zealand
4. Montevideo is the capital of Uruguay
5. Kigali is the capital of Rwanda
6. Melekeok is the capital of Palau
7. Nouakchott is the capital of Mauritania
13
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All of the propositions are true, and I take it that the reader knows at least propositions
1. and 2. As we move further down the list, I take it that you become less confident
in the truth of the propositions written on the page. Notice that even though you are
informed of their truth, you may detect that your confidence in the veracity of 1. and 2.
remains higher than in 5. or 6. (and perhaps you even feel an inclination to check them
for yourself). 1. and 2. may be included among those beliefs that you are certain of.
Certainty is not normally required for belief, but much of the work we take belief to do
at least implies that we are certain of what we believe (Wedgwood, 2012) 1. Propositions
6. and 7. were not known or believed by me before I looked them up for this example,
and while I believed and was reasonably sure that Wellington was the capital of New
Zealand, I was not as confident as I was in 1.
Now it seems to me that the confidence I have in 1. and 2. is the result of having been
told that they are true on a number of occasions far exceeding the number of occasions
I have been told that 7. is true, suggesting that evidential factors come into play with
regard to the strength with which we believe. Even after relying on what I take to be a
trustworthy source, I feel some inclination to double-check 7. and without doing so, I am
cautious about including it among my beliefs; my attitude is not one of suspended belief,
but a sort of contingent believing. This latter aspect is of special interest to those that
seek to equate the function of belief with some upstream role, such as responsiveness to
evidence, and it will be of importance for my own take on belief.
As we will see, the strength of confidence we lend to a claim is not precise in any mean-
ingful sense of the word. Intuition supports this claim:
(THE FAIR COIN) Lets assume that you flip a fair coin. For this example
we will rule out the possibility that it can land on its edge, meaning that there
are only two options, that it will either land heads, or that it will land tails.
How confident ought you to be in the following propositions?
a) The coin will land either heads or tails .
b) The coin will land tails.
c) The coin will land heads.
The answer is clear, you ought to lend maximum confidence to proposition a). Your
credence in proposition b) ought to be .5 as should your credence in c). While it seems
1Those that subscribe to a categorical view of belief do at times make mention of certainty, but do not
draw out the implications of having an attitude that if it does not demand certainty comes at least with
the determinates ‘certain’ or ‘uncertain’. The existence of ‘certainties’ suggests that what we commonly
take to be full belief also comes with a notion of strength of belief ‘built in.’
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the case that we are certain, or highly confident in a), and treat b) and c) as if they are as
likely to occur, is there a detectable confidence of 50 % in either of b) or c)? Specifically, is
there a unit-real n that corresponds to some phenomenology of the attitude of confidence
taken to b) or c)? I am confident that you cannot detect any feeling of 50 % surety
in either of b) or c) and maintain that no such precise confidence is accessible through
introspection. If your intuitions are shaky in the Fair Coin example, consider an alternate
version:
(THE EVER SO SLIGHTLY UNFAIR COIN) Assume a similar setup,
but in this example you know that the coin is ever so slightly unfair. The coin
is unbalanced by a few hundredths of a gram such that it just barely favours
heads. You are told that it has .5123 chance of landing heads, and .4987 of
landing tails.
Do you find it plausible that you could take the relevant attitude towards the claim that
the coin would land heads?2
The salient features of these examples are that we have belief-like attitudes that comes,
roughly, with degrees of confidence. The ‘roughly’ is key here, because ‘confidence’ in-
terpreted as an attitude that exhibits unit-real precision will by definition be absolutely
and infinitely precise. This is problematic for reasons we will discuss at length later.
2.2 Assumptions about the mind
Undergirding my conception of belief are some assumptions about the workings of the
mind — assumptions about our psychological make-up — and a methodological assump-
tion about how inquiries into believings should proceed. These are the assumptions that
Sturgeon (2020) hold as central to placing epistemic attitudes on a sure footing. We will
start in reverse order.
The first assumption is that nature, in some way, comes before norms. In working out
the metaphysics of our belief-like attitudes, we should start from facts about our mental
states and psychology:
2This is inspired by the classical counter-example to humans having attitudes that embody numerical
precision which belongs to I.J Good, who claimed that such claims could be refuted by ‘[...]the sarcastic
request for an estimate correct to twenty decimal places, say, for the probability that the Republicans
will win the election’ (Good, 1962, p.81)
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‘Just as it would be foolish — in my view at least — for an action theorist to
take her primary metaphysical cue, when putting forward a theory of human
action, from approaches to the moral or political status of action, so, it is
assumed here without argument, it would be foolish for a philosopher of mind
to take her primary metaphysical cue, when putting forward a theory of our
mental states, from approaches to when those states are rational, or well
produced, or wise’ (Sturgeon, 2020, p.4).
Our guiding assumption in the following is that epistemic normativity — while immensely
instructive and important in its own right — is secondary to working out the ontological
and metaphysical facts of the attitudes the supposed norms of rationality operate on.
Our first assumption is thus:
Nature before norms-assumption: The nature of mind comes first. Norms of
rationality must be the norms that can regulate the sort of mental states we have.
Much of the work on ideal rationality and rationality more generally bears a hitherto
unexplained relation to the types of epistemic attitudes had by human persons. To start
with the norms of rationality and ‘work backwards’ towards a theory of belief is to put
the cart before the horse.
That is not to say that some assumptions of what it is to be rational or other common
sense assumptions about rationality cannot guide us in shaping our concept of belief. We
believe that it is good to be or believe rationally, after all. We will assume that epistemic
attitudes are the sort of attitudes that can be well taken, in light of evidence or one’s
other beliefs, and that they are attitudes that figure in epistemic evaluation34.
Rationality of States Assumption: Certain of our attitudes are subject to
epistemic appraisal.
On the assumption that the epistemic attitudes figure in our epistemic evaluations, we see
that we can single them from other attitudes that are not subjected to such evaluation.
3That they can figure in such evaluations does not mean that it is a sufficient or necessary condition for
something to constitute ‘belief’ say, that it is rational under any norm.
4Sturgeon (2020) in his work on rational belief draws a distinction between what he calls a theory of
‘states’ and a theory of ‘transitions’. These correspond to the distinction between holding a set of beliefs,
and to changing your mind, that is, adding or retracting a belief. Believings are attitudes that can be
well taken, and a theory of the rationality of states provides an answer to the question of what makes
a set of belief rational or irrational at any time t. It is thus a theory of how beliefs are synchronically
rational. Many theories of this type emphasize that rationality of states is a sort of ‘pretty pattern’; a
set of beliefs can exhibit a pretty pattern, that is, the beliefs are related to each other in a way proper
under some epistemic norms (Littlejohn, 2015).
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Desires, wishes, and dreams are not epistemic attitudes, as they do not figure into such a
calculus. Furthermore, if ‘belief’ is understood roughly as an attitude one can take that
some claim is true, it can be rationally held. But we see that while belief can be rational,
it is not a necessary or sufficient requirement for something to constitute the attitude of
belief that it is rational. After all, we recognize that many beliefs will be irrationally held
either in relation to the evidence we are presented with, or in light of our other beliefs.
While there are strong connections between the concepts of rationality and belief posited
in the literature, we will note that they do come apart.
The third and final assumption we are going to make is concerned with the relation that
obtains between the content of belief-like attitudes and the subjects who have or take or
lend those attitudes to a content. When we say that an agent S believes a proposition P,
this relation is what we have in mind:
Binary attitude assumption: Propositional attitudes are binary relations
between thinkers and propositions.
A binary relation relates a subject to an object of belief. Propositional attitudes usually
take the structure ‘S A that P’, where an agent [the subject] believes [the attitude] that
p [a proposition] (Schwitzgebel, 2019). We could slot in desire as the binary relation, in
which case we would be relating a subject to an object of their desire; ‘S Desires that P’.
Taking an attitude of belief to a content in this way just is what we mean when we say
that someone believes that p (Sturgeon, 2020, p.5). This assumption is meant to signal
realism about propositional attitudes, and stand in stark contrast to those that take a
measure theory of mind, in which propositions are merely indices of psychological states
we ascribe to a person. To believe that p on such a picture is to be in a mental state
that has certain characteristic effects of that state, i.e., one denies that propositions are
objects of belief (see Matthews, 1994; Millar, 2009).
In summary, the nature of belief comes first, in some substantive sense. The norms follow
on. Even if the norms are secondary to our inquiries, they can and will inform following
discussions. Finally, when my view of belief is fully furnished, when I say that we believe,
this just is the relation that obtains between the subject and object of belief.
2.3 Rôles of belief and belief-like attitudes.
I am committed to a robust realism about propositional attitudes in this thesis, and,
as Sturgeon (2020, p.5) puts it, ‘a functionalist take on their nature.’ In the history of
epistemology and philosophy of mind, mental states such as credences, belief and other
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doxastic attitudes have been treated as serving different ‘functional rôles’ (Easwaran,
2017, p.191). In the philosophy of mind, the usual way to describe mental states is in
functional terms; what sort of function does a mental state serve. This has been conceived
of as a causal role the state serves in one’s mental life. What makes something the state
‘pain’ is roughly that it is the sort of state that is triggered by an injury, which in turn
often makes someone seek to avoid what causes the pain, or will cause further pain.
This is a view that sees a functional role primarily as a descriptive characterization of
a given state, but there are also normative views of these functional rôles: Some take it
that a functional role of belief ought to be thus and such in light of various normative
considerations (Easwaran, 2017, pp.189-190).
Getting clear on which of these rôles belief-like attitudes are thought to play is important
because it has motivated different accounts of belief, and it helps me contrast my view
with other accounts that see a different functional role for belief, and hence appeal to
attitudes that are different in kind from simple confidence. The types of rôles that doxastic
attitudes have commonly been thought as playing in our mental lives are upstream, static,
and downstream rôles. Upstream and downstream rôles describe causes and effects,
whereas static rôles are rôles for the mental state, and not any change or transition that
it is caused by or that it causes (Easwaran, 2017). The functional rôles are often in an
interplay, but one role is usually seen as central, and the others derivable from it. My
view sees belief as playing an ‘upstream’ role.
By taking belief to play an ‘upstream role’ one usually references some form of respons-
iveness to evidence (Easwaran, 2017). In particular, ‘upstream’ here means belief as a
function of being caused by evidence, belief as caused by what makes for justification
and so on. Furthermore, belief has been considered mental states, the function of which
is a sort of truth-directedness. This is sometimes called an alethic role; the function of
belief conceived of as the attitude that aims at true representation of the world5. This
is commonly considered a ‘static role’. Finally, there are downstream rôles, those that in
some sense identify the function of belief as those states or attitudes that guide action,
or make us disposed to act. This was prominent among those looking for pragmatic vin-
dication for probabilism, such as with the Dutch-book argument, and other arguments
that in some sense tied belief together with betting behaviour (Easwaran, 2017).
That belief serves a downstream role was of particular importance for decision theorists
and early Bayesians, who thought that we could characterize belief by its effects on
people’s behavior and actions. Furthermore, it was the degree of certainty with which
agents believed that was seen as determining the agents’ behaviour, and so they resorted
5This has analogs in Bayesian epistemology, where this function is conceived of as one directed at
accuracy. There is no straightforward way to map truth and accuracy (Pettigrew, 2019), but this is not
a concern I will address.
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to more fine-grained attitudes such as credence, confidence or subjective probability that
lent themselves to such analysis (Easwaran, 2017).
A common theme in more recent Bayesian epistemology and elsewhere is that perhaps
the main function doxastic attitudes serve — one that distinguishes them from other
propositional attitudes such as bouletic (desire-like) attitudes — is their directedness at
truth. In identifying the function of belief with a downstream role, belief is also thought
to address pragmatic considerations; believing in certain ways can realize certain goals.
However, degreed beliefs ‘[...] have properties that can be understood independently of
their role in the production of action’ (Joyce, 1998, p.576).
Beliefs represent the world, and by believing, we can represent the world in more or less
accurate ways. Purely epistemic concerns have risen to prominence. This turn from the
pignistic to the alethic rôles of belief was promoted by Joyce (1998), who proved that
there is always a probabilistically coherent set of credences available at any world that
will be more accurate than one that is not probabilistically coherent. Bayesians therefore
have non-pragmatic, or what has at times been called purely epistemic vindication6 for
the probabilist project.
In traditional epistemology, there has been a shift from an emphasis on upstream rôles,
such as those that have sought to equate the function of belief as responsiveness to
evidence, evidentialists, and those that turn to facts about justification to investigate
beliefs. Recently, with an increasing emphasis on pragmatic encroachment, traditional
epistemology has taken a turn towards dowstream rôles for belief. Throughout the history
of traditional epistemology, the alethic role of belief has been of importance (Easwaran,
2017).
2.4 Two projects of the attitudes
The descriptive and the normative projects of belief are to a large extent intertwined,
and some distinctions are in order. The models employed in the normative project7 —
be it for full or partial belief, or for the agents that have them — are often idealized
along two dimensions: Along one dimension you will find degrees of precision embodied
by the models. Along the other, you will find degrees of perfection had by the agent
taking whatever attitude or having whatever set of attitudes in question (Christensen,
2004, pp.144-147). It is important for the following exposition to draw two distinctions;
one between ‘belief’ and ‘rational belief’, and the other between actual and ‘ideal agents’.
It is common to attribute to epistemic agents of various kinds attitudes like ‘belief’ and
6A non-pragmatic vindication of probabilism is the name of Joyce’s seminal paper.
7And to some extent in the descriptive project.
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‘credence’, and not uncommon to take it as read that by ‘belief’ one means ‘rational
belief’ in discussions of belief and rationality.
Regarding the type of agents that have epistemic attitudes, one typically distinguishes
between actual and ideal agents. On the one hand, you find actual epistemic agents, like
you and me. It is often assumed that we have the attitudes of ‘belief’ and ‘confidence’.
If ‘credence’ is interpreted strictly, then epistemologists are reluctant to consider these
aspects of the mental lives of human persons (see e.g. Pettigrew, 2016; Staffel, 2020; Stur-
geon, 2020). Human persons qua agents that have belief-like attitudes tend to not be able
to consider the contents and kinematics of large sets of believings simultaneously; if our
believings cohere and so on. We are saddled with doxastic, cognitive and computational
limitations. Some therefore dismiss the notion that human persons have credences —
strictly understood — outright (see e.g. Holton, 2008; Moon, 2017). These are attitudes
common to ascribe to ideal epistemic agents (often ideally rational agents). These latter
agents do not suffer from any of the limitations human persons do on memory, the ability
to compute on the go, or give precise account of their credences even in sets with a vast,
perhaps infinite number of members.
Except for special cases when one considers ideal agents under circumstances where they
are to update their beliefs in light of various new information, and according to different
stripes of conditionalization, or deliberate constraints are placed on their capacities, it
is assumed that they can assess the dynamics and properties of sets of beliefs with any
number of members (see e.g. Leitgeb, 2017; Pettigrew, 2013a, 2016). Ideal agents are
(often useful) fictions or theoretical abstractions employed to investigate the properties
of ideal rationality, and it is not assumed that there is a straightforward way to map the
sort of attitudes that these agents have unto actual agents. Still, in the literature, it is
assumed that there is an important role to be served by, among others, credences, and
more vague notions of partial belief, and so it is useful to know in the following that not
all theories of belief aim at characterizing attitudes that we as humans have.
2.5 Remarks on the reduction question.
As much of the literature is not explicit on which notion of ‘reduction’ is in play when
grounding belief in credence, say, a brief note on reduction is also in order. What does
it mean to say that belief reduces to credence? (Or vice versa) There are a number of
ways such reduction could be construed. If by ‘reduction’ we meant numerical identity
— A reduces to B iff A is identical to B — that would mean that if we took credence to
reduce to belief, then credences just are beliefs. This does not capture the fundamentality
of one epistemic phenomenon over the other intended in many of these views. Belief-as-
credence views treat credence as more fundamental than belief, and so there is an intended
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asymmetry in the view, but reduction as numerical identity is symmetric, and does not
capture this (Jackson, 2020).
Another option would be to treat the reduction as one of supervenience, where if we
took belief to supervene on credence, once we had fixed the facts about credence, we had
thereby fixed the facts about belief, as is a common conception of supervenience. Another
way to put this is that there cannot be a change to B without there being a change to A
which B supervenes on (McLaughlin & Bennett, 2018).
A final option is to take reduction to mean grounding, which is taken to entail super-
venience8. This is the view I am going to be taking, and I will ground the coarse-grained
attitudes of belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief in their finer-grained relatives. My
view will take the coarse-grained attitudes to stand in relation to confidences as determin-
ates and determinables respectively (Wilson, 2017). This will respect our talk of ‘belief’,
and the other coarse-grained attitudes, and our practices involving them, but strictly
speaking, they are all species of confidence.
8Supervenience is not taken to entail grounding.
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Having presented my two examples and drawn important distinctions between ‘belief’
and ‘rational belief’ and between ideal epistemic agents and actual agents, we turn to the
nature of belief, confidence, and credence. ‘Credence’ will receive something of a fuller
treatment, because it is tied so intimately to models of rationality. We will therefore
see the type of philosophical work that they are supposed to do first hand. Much of the
debate on belief-like attitudes and their norms turns on the existence of different concepts
of belief and the scales of measurement they occupy. We will then turn to the ontology
of belief, and see that we have intuition to support the notion that both ‘belief’ and
‘confidence’ refer.
3.1 Belief
Belief is often seen as an on/off affair. This seems to be presupposed in our assertoric
practices and in many of our other activities involving belief-like attitudes. This suggests
that in many of our dealings with belief, we treat it as an attitude you simply take or
fail to take towards some claim (Christensen, 2004, pp.12-13). At a first pass, we will
understand a belief in something as thinking that something is the case; that a proposition
p is true (see e.g Schwitzgebel, 2019). ‘Belief’ is understood, in philosophy and elsewhere,
to be a mental state of a certain kind. Most philosophers take the position that belief is
a mental state, the content of which is propositional (Schwitzgebel, 2019; Leitgeb, 2017,
p.2)1.
On a common view, ‘belief’ is a categorical notion, occupying a categorical or nominal
scale (Leitgeb, 2017, p.9). This is how belief is understood in traditional epistemology,
where there are only three attitudes one can take towards a proposition that can be the
object of belief, namely, belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief. This is understood as
taking the attitude that p, disbelieving p, i.e., believing that ¬p, or not believing either
of p and ¬p. It often goes unremarked that as disbelief on such a picture just is belief in
the negation of a claim, there are really only two kinds of attitude that come with the
traditional conception of belief (Christensen, 2004; Rinard, 2017). Furthermore, some
1Some believe that the content of beliefs are not propositions but sets of probability spaces (see e.g.
Moss, 2016)
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claim that it is more to be said about the attitude of suspension of belief than merely
failing to believe both of p and ¬p (Christensen, 2004).
If failing to believe both a claim and its negation meant that you took the attitude of
suspension of belief, then you would by that definition suspend about any claim that
you had never considered. This is not what we usually mean by suspension of belief.
One is not suspending belief in a proposition one has never considered2, and whether one
can suspend belief in propositions one cannot grasp is also under debate3. It is claimed
that taking the attitude of suspension requires a commitment to remain agnostic as to
whether p. This commitment is said to be or be involved in the attitude of suspension.
Suspension of belief represents or simply is an agent S’s attitude of neutrality towards
the truth of a claim p (Rinard, 2017).
Many of our beliefs seem to answer to the categorical conception quite readily. Beliefs
such as ‘2+2 = 4’, and ‘Oslo is the capital of Norway’ are two of them, and there are innu-
merable others. We seem to have strong prima facie grounds for assuming that attitudes
of this kind exist. They are central to folk psychology and to traditional epistemology.
They are also datums of everyday life. While this does not prove their existence, their
utility and practical applicability certainly hints at it. If we assume for now that the
signature function of the attitude ‘belief’ is that it guides action, then we have explan-
ations for a lot of the behaviour we observe in others4. That they seem so integral to
our understanding of our mental lives, and our social practices, provide further support
for the notion that these attitudes are part of our psychological make-up (Christensen,
2004).
2It is also possible that one is not taking the attitude of suspension of belief in propositions not currently
present in mind. The distinction between occurrent and dispositional belief is not of much importance
here.
3Some take it that we also do not suspend judgement in propositions that we cannot grasp or understand,
but this is less clearly the case:
1. The Riemann Hypothesis:
The real part of every non-trivial zero of the Riemann zeta function is 12 (Bombieri, 2021).
2. The Poincaré Conjecture:
Every simply connected, closed 3-manifold is homeomorphic to the 3-sphere (Milnor, 2021).
Now, I am as baffled by the contents of 1. as I am by 2.; I neither grasp nor understand what they
express, even though they are stated in plain English augmented with fragments of the language of
mathematics, and I understand each word that composes the sentences. I do however know that 2. has
been proven by Perelman (Milnor, 2021), and that the proof has been accepted by the mathematical
community, and so my attitude towards 2. is one of belief or high confidence. Regarding 1. I am at a
loss to try to work out what probabilities there would be for the claim that 1. was true or false.
4I am not endorsing behaviourism.
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3.2 Credence
With credence comes a doxastic taxonomy that is a lot more fine-grained than the one
that comes with full belief. It is actually infinitely more refined, seeing as there is an
uncountable number of credences one could take. Credences are thought to occupy an
absolute numerical scale, and they are considered (or at least thought representable by)
precise real numbers in the unit interval, [0, 1]. By precise one means infinitely precise,
so a .5 credence lent to some proposition is elliptical for a credence of .5 followed by an
unending number of decimals. By convention, a credence to degree 1 is interpreted as the
certainty that a proposition p is true, a credence to degree 0 is interpreted as certainty
that ¬p is true, whereas any credence n where 0 < n < 1 represents an agent’s strength
of belief between these extremes (Leitgeb, 2017, p.9-10).
3.2.1 Credal epistemology.
This section will exhibit aspects of the theoretical work that credences are supposed
to do. This exposition serves a dual purpose: The full thrust of arguments against
credences being attitudes humans can take is felt only after one sees what sort of rigour
they demand on part of the agent that has them. Furthermore, my own take on belief
conceives of ‘belief’ as grounded in something rather less granular than credence. The
following sections will later serve to bring into clear relief some deficiencies of my view
with regard to its utility in reasoning about rationality.
While I am primarily interested in credence as one way of conceiving of beliefs coming
in degrees, perhaps the main purpose of credence in Bayesian epistemology has been to
settle questions of what ideal rationality amounts to. This is how formal models of ra-
tionality gain their epistemic purchase: They promise that one can settle questions about
which configurations of epistemic states are better than alternative states across worlds,
and hence more or even ideally rational. We will look at Joyce’s (1998) argument for
probabilism: If you hold a set of credences that is not probabilistically coherent, there will
always be such a set available that is more accurate, no matter how the world turns out.
You are holding an accuracy-dominated set of credences. This is coupled with a specific
conception of epistemic value — veritism — which maintains that the fundamental epi-
stemic good comes from the accuracy of one’s set of beliefs; that one’s beliefs represent
the world as it is. On such a picture, having a less accurate set of credences than another
that is available, i.e., a probabilistically in-coherent set, is irrational (Pettigrew, 2016,
p.6).
The following is a common presentation of credence and its kinematics inspired by Pet-
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tigrew (2013a, 2016)5. This relies on applications of standard decision theory brought to
bear on epistemic problems.
In standard decision theory, an agent has a set of options, and the procedures of decision
theory rule out some subset of those options as irrational for the agent to take depending
on the utility that each option or combination of options is thought to provide for an
agent6. Joyce (1998) applied this general strategy to epistemology. A set of possible
epistemic states is treated as the options that an agent is faced with in standard decision
theory. In this instance, the epistemic states are represented by credences and possible
worlds, and such a state is called a credal state (Pettigrew, 2013a). Pettigrew (2016),
parses ‘options’ as ‘opinions’. This is merely stylistic, they denote the same phenomenon,
but I will call them ‘opinions’.
Possible epistemic states, in our case credences lent to propositions, represent the options
of decision theory, and the principles of decision theory rule some subset of these out as
irrational (unless they are rational). To do this, one defines an epistemic utility function.
This takes as input an epistemic state and each way the world could be, and returns a
measure of epistemic value the state would have if the world was that way. The epistemic
state in question is called a credal state, which is represented by an agent’s credence-
function defined over some possible world. The output is the epistemic utility of that
function at that world (Pettigrew, 2013a)7.
Let an opinion represent a partial specification of a credal state. Say I have opinions
about only two propositions:
A. It will rain tomorrow.
B. I will get a lot of email today.
5‘Kinematics’ denotes properties had by a system across time, contrasted with ‘dynamics’ that describes
the forces that bring about change in a system (Sturgeon, 2020, p.106).
6We will set aside worries about doxastic voluntarism. Dominance is not a choice principle, it simply
says of a credence function that it is less rational than another, even thought the agent that has the
function may not have the possibility of switching to another credence function.
7Pettigrew (2013a, 2016) makes the case not only for the types of constraints there should be on ideal
rationality, but also for how one is to go about reasoning and discovering what these constraints are.
His work is in this regard not only a piece of philosophy, but also a sustained defence of a certain
metaphilosophical approach to formal philosophy. His arguments proceed in three general stages:
(I) You define an epistemic utility function,
(II) A principle of decision theory is then put to the test.
(III) (I) and (II) serves to prove a mathematical theorem (see Pettigrew, 2013a).
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The set {A,B} is my opinion set. Had I been concerned with
C. Bringing an umbrella tomorrow is a good idea.
My opinion set would be {A,B,C}, and any propositions that we are concerned with
form such a set.
To reason further about situations such as the ones above, we need familiarity with some
technical notions, in particular notions of possible worlds.
A possible world is for our purposes defined as a way that the world might be8. There
might be a tea pot orbiting Mars, and there might not. These are then two distinct
ways the world could be, and they constitute two possible worlds. The set of all possible
worlds we shall denoteW . The union of all subsets ofW exhausts all the ways the world
could be. It is common to consider only possible worlds in W that are relevant to our
interests, and so to make W sufficiently granular to whatever inquiry one is conducting
(Genin, 2019).
We take it that there is a true possible world among the possible worlds in W , and we
say that w ∈ W . A proposition is a set of possible worlds, P ⊆ W . A proposition is a
partial specification of the way that the world is. A proposition P is true iff w ∈ P , that
is to say that to know that a proposition P is true is to know that the true world w is
among the set of worlds {w : w ∈ P}.
My doxastic state can be represented by a function cHenrik : {A,B} → [0, 1], which is my
credence function on {A,B} (Pettigrew, 2013a). To get the view called probabilism, the
credence function would have to be subject to further constraints: It would have to be a
probability function in order for the agent to be rational. For cHenrik to be a probability
function on {A,B} it would have to be subject to the axioms of probability. We will
specify those axioms but for an arbitrary finite set of propositions F to emphasize that
any function on F that obeys the axioms is a probability function. This idea naturally
generalizes to other functions defined on other sets of propositions.
In the following F is a finite set of propositions, and c is a credence function on F that
takes as its input credences, and returns a real number in the unit interval [0,1]. For
a credence function c : F → [0, 1], to be a probability function on F , it would have to
observe the following constraints9:
8Might as in a logically consistent way the world could be.
9These constraints appear as presented here in (Dalstø, 2018).
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1. F is a field (sometimes called an algebra)10, and it is
2. Nonnegative: For all propositions X ⊆ W ,Cr(X) ≥ 0
3. Normalized : Cr(W) = 1, for all tautologies in W
4. Finitely additive: if X and Y are disjoint, then Cr(X ∪ Y ) = Cr(X) + Cr(Y )
Do note that from this definition it follows that agents must be logically omniscient,
i.e., assign all logical truths credence 1, contradictions credence 0, and in the case that
some proposition P entails Q, assign Q at least as high a probability as P in order to
have probabilistically coherent sets of credences (Christensen, 2004, pp.150-151; Talbott,
2016).
3.2.2 Dominance
With the above elements in place, we can measure the accuracy of an agent’s set of beliefs.
This in turn allows us to make verdicts about the epistemic status of sets of credences
relative to worlds. To show how a set can be dominated, we need to define a vindicated
credence function, and a measure of distance that can be used to determine a credence
function’s proximity to the vindicated function. We will use a measure called the Brier
score, a common measure of accuracy11.
To represent the accuracy of a credence function of an agent at a world, we measure
its distance from the vindicated credence function at that world. At a world, there is a
credence function that enjoys maximum epistemic utility, that is, the vindicated, perfect,
or omniscient credence function at that world. The idea we are trying to capture is
that there exists a best such function at any world — the best function an agent could
have epistemically — and that its epistemic goodness flows from its accuracy. It is the
credence function that assigns 1 to all and only truths at W, and 0 to falsehoods, that is
vW (X) :=
0 if X is false at W1 if X is true at W
10For F to be an algebra, it must contain W, and further be closed under intersection, union and
complementation. If we have two elements A,B ∈ F then for F to be an algebra we would also
have to have the elements W, A ∪ B,A ∩ B, ¬A and ¬B One often encounters the notion of F being
a σ-algebra. For F to be a σ-algebra it would have to observe all of the above constraints and be
closed under countable intersection, that is if S ⊆ F is a countable collection of propositions then the
intersection of all the elements ∩S is also an element of F .
11Pettigrew argues that the Brier score is the correct measure of distance for accuracy. There are others,
but a discussion of their merits is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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The distance from the vindicated credence function to another credence function is meas-





The sum ranges over the propositions X that vw and c assigns credence to. The distance
between the credence functions is the squared difference between the credences that vw
and c assigns. Together with the assumption that the utility of a credence function at a
world is equal to its distance from the vindicated credence function at that world, this
gives the Brier score (Pettigrew, 2013a):




Bayesians appeal to the decision-theoretic principle of dominance to rule some credence
function as irrational (or rational) relative to other possible credence functions an agent
might have had. A credence function can fare better or worse with regard to the vindic-
ated credence function at a world, and you can hold a function that is less inaccurate no
matter how the world turns out. This is the central idea of epistemic utility theory: Being
inaccurate does not make you irrational by itself; being more inaccurate than you could
have been because your credence function is not a probability function does. Formally:
(Dominance) Suppose that A is an opinion set, W a set of possible worlds, and
U a measure of the value of opinions in A at the worlds in W . Then for opinions
a, a′ ∈ A:
• a strongly U -dominates a′ if U(a′, w) < U(a, w) for all worlds in W .
• a weakly U -dominates a′ if for all worlds in W , U(a′, w) ≤ U(a, w) and
U(a′, w) < U(a, w) for at least one world w in W .
Suppose a, a′ ∈ A and:
1. a strongly U -dominates a′,
2. There is no a′′ ∈ A that weakly U -dominates a
Then a′ is irrational (see Pettigrew, 2013b).
With veritism and dominance defined, we can now show why it is irrational to hold a set
that is not probabilistically coherent. Suppose that F is a set of propositions, and that
CHAPTER 3. THE EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES
we have two credence functions cHenrik and c defined on F , that is cHenrik, c : F → [0, 1].
F is the opinion set of cHenrik and c. For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that I have




Let us also define the credence function c:
c(X) = 0.47
c(X) = 0.53
In this instance, there are only two possible worlds; one where X is true and X is false,
and one where X is true and X is false. Let w1 be the world where X is true and X
false, and w2 the world where the reverse is the case. I will only calculate the score for
the functions relative to the vindicated function at w1. Those so inclined can check that
c is also more accurate relative to w2 themselves.
The squared Euclidean distance (d2) from vw1 to cHenrik is given by:




= |vw1(X)− cHenrik(X)|2 + |vw1(X)− cHenrik(X)|2
= |1− 0.65|2 + |0− 0.7|2 = 0.6125
For c relative to vw1 :




= |vw1(X)− c(X)|2 + |vw1(X)− c(X)|2
= |1− 0.47|2 + |0− 0.53|2 = 0.5618
As we see, the probabilistic credence function c has a lower Brier score than cHenrik, which
means that it is less in-accurate than cHenrik relative to vw1 (and also vw2). This points to
a general feature of credence functions: If a credence function is not a probability function
on some algebra F , then there is always such a function that accuracy-dominates it, in
this instance among others c, that accuracy-dominates cHenrik. My credence function
is dominated precisely because it is not a probability function on F . All probabilistic
credence functions are not even weakly dominated by any other credence function —
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there is no way for a probabilistic credence function to meet both clauses that makes
for a weakly dominated credence function — whereas any non-probabilistic function is






Figure 1: The points cHenrik and c represent the accuracy of those credence functions
relative to w1 and w2. Any point on either of the blue arches represents a credence function
that is exactly as in-accurate as cHenrik relative to either w1 and w2 (the intersections
between the arches are exactly as inaccurate relative to both worlds), and any point in
the region between their intersections represents a possible credence function that weakly
accuracy-dominates cHenrik (unless they are along the red diagonal). Any point along the
red diagonal line represents a probabilistic credence function, such as c, which strongly
accuracy-dominates cHenrik.
What is missing from this picture is that our world is actual. The world has already
turned out to be as it is, and there is an argument to be made that Bayesians are not
sufficiently sensitive to the fact that there ought to be only one vindicated credence
function that our credence functions are assessed against; the one that assigns 1 to all
truths at our world and 0 to all falsehoods. Other, merely possible, worlds should not be
relevant to such an analysis.
3.3 Credal sets
In the literature on credence, there has been recognition that degreed belief at times
seems to be more vague than what credences allow for. In one sense, this could be
because our credences are imprecise — you quickly round up some decimal points when
asserting what your credence in some p is, say — or because they are indeterminate:
At times credences do not come with real-valued precision (Lyon, 2017). Some therefore
12Proved by de Finetti, and known as De Finetti’s Dominance Theorem (Pettigrew, 2016, p.17).
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take the notion of credal sets to be a better — albeit more imprecise — model of our
fine-grained attitudes (see e.g. Joyce, 2010; Lyon, 2017; Sturgeon, 2008)13. We will look
closer at these later, but for now, imagine that a credal set is a convex set14 that is the
interval of all the credence functions one could take towards some claim, e.g., a set of all
the credence functions in the interval [.7,.9].
3.4 Confidence, a force-based attitude
Some of our beliefs seem more complex than what is intended by the categorical concep-
tion of belief, but at the same time less granular than credence. While I am extremely
close to 100 % confident that it is the case that two and two makes four, I am roughly
80-90 % confident that I will pass all my classes this semester, and even less confident
in the proposition that I will do so with all A’s. These latter belief-like attitudes are
closer to what I refer to as ‘confidences’. Crucially, they also seem to be the sort of
attitudes that we recognize as part of our psychology (Sturgeon, 2020). While they seem
to occupy another scale than one that is categorical, they do not seem to be the sort of
attitudes that can easily fit within an absolute numerical scale. For one thing, it is hard
to distinguish between being 80-90% certain that I will pass all my classes, and being
81-91 % certain. This is where the cognitive forces enter into the picture.
3.4.1 Force-based attitudes
This section will introduce force-based attitudes. As we go along, readers might find that
these have an air of familiarity to them, which Sturgeon (2020, pp.272-275) attribute to
them belonging to our common conception of mind. This section will work by analogy
in order to draw up the contours of force-based attitudes in general, and what we will
think of as those cognitive forces that underwrites our various confidences in particular.
In later chapters, I will put cognitive forces to use in a force-based threshold view of our
believings, and show that the resulting view provides non-trivial theoretical benefits.
13Credal sets go by many names: credence-intervals, spread-out credence, thick confidence, sharp thick
confidence and so on. I will refer to them as ‘credal sets’ or ‘sharp thick confidence’.
14That a set is convex means, a bit simplified, that it does not contain any ‘gaps’, that all credence
functions in some interval are members of the credal set (Lyon, 2017, see e.g.).
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To get intuitions going, consider a work of art such as the one below.
Figure 2: Attraction or repulsion? Reflection (Self-Portrait) - Lucian Freud, 1985
Upon seeing the work - maybe for the first time - one of three things are likely to happen:
• You are drawn to the work.
• You are repelled by the work.
• You remain neutral towards it.
Much as one may be aesthetically attracted to or repulsed by a work of art, or remain
neutral towards it, one may be attracted, repulsed, or neutral towards some work in har-
monious or dissonant mixtures of the cognitive pro, con, and neutral aesthetic cognitive
forces. These forces can cohabit in the mind, and so you may well be both repulsed
and attracted towards something at the same time. These mixtures may in one instance
result in instability, in which case you find no stable disposition to react to the piece of
art, and are torn as to what you think of it. We will call this a dissonant mixture.
The blend of cognitive force may also come in functionally harmonious mixtures, in which
case you may achieve a sort of behavioural equilibrium towards the work (Sturgeon, 2020,
p.274). If the forces of repulsion and attraction come in (roughly) equal measure, you
may experience a considered indifference towards the work of art. If the forces do not
come in equal measure, but still achieve a functional stability point, then you are likely to
be somewhat attracted when strong attraction is tempered by some measure of repulsion
or neutrality, or strongly attracted to the work of art if there is less repulsion in the
mix. Conversely, you may find yourself somewhat or strongly repelled by it, again as the
stability point is brought about by a mixture of repulsion and a smaller or larger portion
of attraction or neutrality. This is all to say that cognitive forces may combine such that
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they make for functional stability points that underwrite your attitude(s) towards the
work of art, whether these be pro, con, or neutral in flavour, which in turn generates a
stable disposition to react towards the piece of art (Sturgeon, 2020, pp.273-274).
Assume for now that the mechanics of these aesthetic cognitive forces carry over to our
dealings with claims about how the world is: That much like pro- and con forces and
neutrality can bring about an attitude towards a piece of art, the same may be said of
cognitive forces towards claims. For any given claim C, you might then find that you:
• Are attracted to the claim.
• That the claim repels you.
• You remain neutral towards the claim.
If you are intellectually attracted to a claim, you are likely to treat the claim as if it
was true in behaviour and reasoning. In talking of intellectual repulsion, the opposite is
likely going to be the case; you will not treat the claim as if it were true, but rather as
if it was false. With intellectual neutrality you do not know what to make of the claim;
there is neither push nor pull towards treating the claim as true, and you refrain from
relying on the claim in reasoning and behaviour (Sturgeon, 2020, p.275). Intellectual
attraction, repulsion and neutrality, and functionally harmonious mixtures of same are
brought about in interaction with the epistemic reasons you have for a claim C.
In the first instance, something about C might give rise to an intellectual or psychological
pull towards C. You may discover that you have some evidence for the truth of C; some
epistemic reason to think that C, and that this reason exacts a psychological pull towards
treating C as if it were the case. If your intellectual attraction to C rises as a consequence
of the evidential force of your epistemic reasons(s) for thinking that C, then you are likely
to behave as if C is the case; you come to consider C as true in practical and theoretical
deliberation and so on (Sturgeon, 2020, p.274). Consider some claim p for which you
have some evidence, i.e., some evidential reasons for thinking that p is the case. If you
happen on more evidence supporting p, you are likely to find that this evidence exacts
a psychological pull on you towards thinking p to be true, and you are likely to come to
treat it as the case, rely on it in reasoning etc. In sum, common sense recognizes this
intellectual attraction towards claims.
The opposite might happen. Upon considering C you find that you have some evidence
that ¬C is the case, or rather that you have no evidence that seems to support C. In
interaction with your epistemic grounds for thinking that C is the case, i.e., in reviewing
or contemplating the evidence you have for C you may feel a psychological push in the
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opposite direction; some pull towards ¬C, or rather push-from C. You do not come to lean
on C as being the case in your theoretical or practical deliberation. If the psychological
push from the epistemic reasons you have for C is sufficiently strong, you may come to
treat ¬C as the case (Sturgeon, 2020, p.275). Like in the case of attraction, common
sense recognizes this intellectual repulsion from claims: Upon considering whether the
claim ‘It is raining outside’ is true, the weather report showing no sign of rain, nor seeing
any rain when gleaning out the window, should push you from treating the claim true.
In the third instance, upon considering C, you may find that there are no strong pro
or con-forces that prompt you to behave as if C is the case or not. You remain neutral
towards C because you lack an effective reason pertaining to the truth-value of the claim
(Sturgeon, 2020, p.275). The attitude is one of considered indifference towards C in deal-
ings with the claim. An instance could be the claim, Z: ‘It has never snowed in Zanzibar’.
You may have evidential reasons suggesting a con-attitude towards the claim: Zanzibar
is an autonomous region of Tanzania, and surely Tanzania has an average temperature
that is higher than most places that you would think it has snowed, but do your reasons
for thinking that Z exact a pull towards thinking the claim true, or a push-from Z, i.e.,
thinking that ¬Z in your practical or theoretical deliberations involving Z? The upshot of
this example is that common sense recognizes this considered neutrality towards claims.
3.4.2 Confidence, the attitude.
As my view of belief is a critique of Sturgeon’s, some distinctions in the different senses
of ‘confidence’ are in order. On Sturgeon’s (2020) picture, confidence can come with the
precision of credence, it can shade ‘precision-wise’ into credal sets, and also exhibit vague-
ness, in what he calls ‘mushy thick confidence’. In talking of (mushy)15 thick confidence,
a concept we will return to later, he claims that it is ‘basically Ramsey’s subjectivism
stripped of its real-valued mathematics and the overly precise metaphysics meant to be
modelled by it’ (Sturgeon, 2010). This passage captures what I will refer to as ‘simple
confidence’: an attitude that describes the degree to which we take some proposition p
to be true or the case, but without the unit-real precision of credence. It is not precise
because simple confidences as I understand them are essentially vague phenomena. I will
expand upon the metaphysics of confidence in later chapters, but the above description
should suffice for present purposes.
15The ‘mushy’ is added in later work (Sturgeon, 2020).
4 Puzzles and projects
As I said in the introduction, we are not primarily concerned with epistemic norms of
rational belief. However, such norms have informed views of belief to a large extent, and
models of what it is for belief to be rational point to features that we would very much
like our theory of belief to possess. However, conflict arises when we try to square the
metaphysics of the belief-like attitudes with plausible epistemic norms thought to operate
on or regulate them (Christensen, 2004; Sturgeon, 2020, pp.223-225).
Two paradoxes — the Lottery paradox and the Preface paradox — show that a coarse-
grained view, a fine-grained view, and a threshold view, along with what is argued to be
their epistemic norms, cannot all be reconciled1. Something seems to go wrong either
in the ontology of our belief-like attitudes, or in their norms. We are presented with a
‘puzzle’ which is to sort out the relation between the metaphysics and epistemology of
our belief-like attitudes in the least painful way.
4.1 Pieces of the puzzle
We have two attitudinal spaces. One coarse-grained and one fine-grained. Recall the
questions we are faced with from the introduction:
1. How do elements within the coarse- and fine-grained attitudinal spaces relate to
each other?
2. How do elements of one attitudinal space relate to elements of the other?
Two replies are common to the first question: Either the attitudes of the coarse and
fine-grained attitudinal spaces interreduce — e.g., belief as more basic an attitude than
suspended belief — or they do not. Those that maintain that they do are intra-level
reductionists, and they place metaphysical priority on the attitude they take to be basic,
and approach the other attitudes within the attitudinal space as somehow generated
from this more basic attitude. Those that do not take them to interreduce, intra-level
1And other things besides. There are a number of interesting aspects of these paradoxes that I cannot
discuss at length here (see Sorensen, 2020).
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antireductionists, must admit of a wider range of attitudes that are all metaphysically on
par. They also take the attitudes to be subject to proprietary epistemic norms (see e.g.
Sturgeon, 2008, 2010, 2020).
This dialectic carries over mutatis mutandis to question 2. Some take the fine-grained
attitudes to reduce to the coarse-grained attitudes, others reverse the order of reduction.
Still others maintain that they do not interreduce, and must again admit a wider expanse
of attitudes. Those that place priority on the coarse-grained attitudes are representatives
of the ‘coarse view’. Those that take the fine-grained attitudes to be metaphysically
fundamental represent the ‘fine view’. It also seems plausible that the coarse-view grows
metaphysically from the fine view; what we believe, disbelieve and suspend belief about
seems fixed by the confidence we lend to the various objects of belief a lot of the time
(Sturgeon, 2008). Those that argue that the coarse view grows from the fine view in this
way we will call ‘threshold views’.
4.1.1 Epistemic norms
Those that take a coarse-grained view claim that belief is subject to deductive constraints
(see e.g. Christensen, 2004; Sturgeon, 2008; Wedgwood, 2002). On the categorical view
of belief, ideally rational belief is thought subject to a conjunction norm or rule, and an
entailment norm or rule. There is disagreement as to what the norms say, but at a first
pass, these are the rules in question:
• The conjunction rule: If one rationally believes that p, and one rationally
believes that q, one should also believe that p∧ q, that is, one should believe
the conjunction of any two rational beliefs.
It would be strange indeed to believe that Paris is the capital of France, and believe that
Berlin is the capital of Germany, but fail to believe the conjunction of these propositions.
This is thought to hold for any propositions believed on the categorical view.
The second rule that is thought to hold for rational categorical belief is the rule of
entailment:
• The entailment rule: If one believes that p and one believes that p ⇒ q,
then one ought to believe that q
This rule says that one should believe any proposition that is a consequence of the rational
beliefs that one holds. If one fails to believe these consequences, then something is intu-
itively wrong with one’s way of forming beliefs. It is widely believed that our rationally
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held coarse-grained attitudes are preserved by conjunction and entailment, and that this
is a correct idealization of rationality of the categorical view of belief (Christensen, 2004;
Sturgeon, 2008). Coarse-grained attitudes and their rational requirements represent the
first part of the puzzle.
For fine-grained views, the norms that regulate rationally invested credence are those
of probabilistic coherence2. Our confidence or credence can be more or less rationally
invested. Two candidate norms stand out:
• The partition rule: If P1 − Pn is a logical partition, and one has the
credences cr1 − crn, then one’s credences should sum to unity across the
partition, that is (cr1 + ... + crn) = 1
Rationally invested credence or confidence ought to sum to unity across a logical partition,
that is, the sum of credences lent to each cell of the partition ought to be 1. If we take a
simple example — a set containing a proposition and its negation, {X,X}— (a classical)
logic ensures that at most one of them can be true. If we are 70% certain of X then
rationality demands that we are 30% certain of X on the fine view. As we saw, when
discussing accuracy-dominance, if credence does not distribute over cells of a partition in
this way — one’s credence function is not a probability function — then there is such a
distribution that is guaranteed to be more accurate at any world.
The second norm of fine-grained attitudes is widely considered to be that any tautology
should receive credence 1. That is:
• The tautology rule: If P is a tautology, then one’s credence in P ought to
be 1.
The fine-grained view accepts this by definition (see Easwaran, 2011; Pettigrew, 2016;
Sturgeon, 2008). By the partition rule, we see that the negation of a tautology should
receive credence 0. These norms, along with the fine-grained attitudes, represent the
second piece of the puzzle. What is not immediately obvious from the above definitions
is that the norms of outright belief is a special or limit case of norms of degreed belief:
If we take belief and credence 1 to coincide, then closure and entailment is also thought
to constrain ideally rationally held degreed belief (see Christensen, 2004).
The third piece of the puzzle is that the fine- and coarse- view looks to be related in a
particular way: When we lend high credence, we also seem to believe what the proposition
2This is the view called ‘probabilism’. Add to this view the further constraint on rational belief that
one should update one’s set of credences by conditionalization, and you have the rudiments of the view
called ‘Bayesianism’ (see e.g. Easwaran, 2011; Pettigrew, 2016)
37
CHAPTER 4. PUZZLES AND PROJECTS
for which we lend high credence expresses, at least a lot of the time, and under normal
circumstances. This is the threshold view. We will discuss these at length later, but for
now, consider a threshold view our third piece of the puzzle.
We thus have the pieces:
• The Coarse View
• The Fine View
• The Threshold View
4.1.2 Disagreeable consequences
It is widely known that these norms create problems for those that seek to reconcile coarse,
fine and threshold views. The norms have so-called ‘wide-scope requirements’, that is,
they are to apply to your configuration of all your belief-like attitudes (Littlejohn, 2015).
The paradoxes show that you are forced to believe and disbelieve an obvious contradiction.
Belief in obvious contradictions is held to be irrational on any view 3. If one is to count
as rational, one had better make sure that one’s set of beliefs {B1....Bn} does not include
a belief in a claim p and its negation; one bad apple supposedly spoils the cart. Below are
somewhat modified versions of the Lottery and Preface Paradoxes, tailored to generate
tension when we try to reconcile these three pieces of the puzzle. You do not need
to reconcile these pieces to see that there exists tensions between the metaphysics and
epistemology of belief; the Lottery and Preface paradox are often thought to show the
tensions that exists in the epistemology of coarse-grained attitudes alone (see Christensen,
2004).
Imagine holding a ticket in a lottery with a hundred tickets, only one of which is a winning
ticket. Let L1, be the claim that the first ticket loses, L2 that the second loses, and so
on. Let W be the claim that some ticket wins. Your confidence that each ticket lost
should be large, 99%. Your confidence in W ought to be 1, as you know that there is one
winning ticket among the 100. Assuming for now that the threshold for belief is ≥ .994,
the threshold view entails that you believe each of these claims.
This is problematic, because you ought then to be believing the following conjunction:
∧L = (L1 ∧ L2 ∧ L3 ∧ ... ∧ L100).
3Any claim whatsoever is entailed by a contradiction in a classical logic. High credence in both members
of a set of proposition{X,X} is probabilistically incoherent, so this is ruled as irrational as well.
4The lottery can be made arbitrarily large such that it ensures belief on the threshold view.
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Any rationally held belief is preserved by the conjunction rule, and you believe of each
conjunct that it will lose, so you ought to believe their conjunction.
Now think of the disjunction of claims
∨¬L = (¬L1 ∨ ¬L2 ∨ ... ∨ ¬L100)
Since you believe that a ticket will win, this entails the disjunction, and by the entailment
rule, you should believe the disjunction. The conjunction entails that the disjunction is
false — if every ticket is a loser, no ticket can be a winner — so you ought to believe
its negation. You therefore ought to believe an explicit contradiction (∨¬L ∧ ¬∨¬L),
which does not seem to be rational at all. Together with the threshold view and the fine
view, this spells disaster: The negation of (∨¬L ∧ ¬∨¬L) is a tautology, so it should be
lent credence 1. But these claims are a logical partition, and so (∨¬L ∧ ¬∨¬L) should
receive credence 0. The coarse view along with the fine view and the threshold view
together entail that you at the same time both ought and ought not to believe a claim
(see Christensen, 2004; Sturgeon, 2008).
The Preface Paradox generates trouble in a similar way. Do note however that the
Lottery paradox generates trouble for threshold views in a straightforward way, whereas
the setup for the Preface paradox is qualitative, i.e., the claims do not ‘come with’ fixed
probabilities of being true or false. This has little bearing on the current example, but
the difference has been emphasized in the literature (Sorensen, 2020). Assume that in the
preface of this thesis I wrote that some claim contained within it was false or mistaken5
Assume further that each individual claim in the book was written on the form of a list,
so that you have claims C1, C2, ..., Cn. Now, I have spent a large amount of time on this
thesis, tried my best to check the veracity of each claim and so on. I therefore believe
each separate claim, but crucially, I also believe the claim in the preface. We therefore
have it that by the conjunction rule I ought to believe the conjunction:
∧C = (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ ... ∧ Cn).
In addition to that, I believe that p, ‘Some claim contained within this thesis is false’.
As in the Lottery Paradox, by the conjunction rule and the entailment rule, these claims
yield a contradiction. ∧C entails ¬p, by the conjunction rule, I ought therefore to believe
p ∧ ¬p. Enter the fine-grained view. The negation of p ∧ ¬p is a tautology, but together
with p ∧ ¬p they form a partition, so I ought to both believe and not believe p ∧ ¬p.
5I am quite certain that this is the case.
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4.2 Responses to the puzzles
The major reactions to these puzzles are subjects of following chapters. They fall in either
of three categories; belief-eliminativism, credence-eliminativism, and dualism about our
attitudinal ontology. Some take the puzzle to show that coarse-grained attitudes and
their epistemology are specious. They set them aside and build an epistemology run on
credence. Belief-eliminativists reverse the order; the fine view is flawed and cannot be
joined with our coarse-grained attitudes. Their response is to reject the fine view and
its norms. Dualists see a space for both the fine and the coarse view, along with their
norms. They reject the threshold connection between our two attitudinal spaces; coarse
attitudes and credence are metaphysically and epistemologically independent phenomena.
At times, we reason with belief, at other times with credence, but there is no intrinsic
connection between them. In the next chapter, I will show that we should find these
responses too hasty; we ought to favour a reductive view of our attitudes. The different
positions taken towards belief are found in Figure 1, below.
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The ontological question












































































Figure 3: The metaphysics of belief and credence (Jackson, 2020)
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5 Eliminativism and dualism
This chapter will deal with eliminativist- and dualist positions. As we saw in chapter
4., a fine view, a coarse view, and a threshold view along with their respective norms
cannot all be true together, and for this reason dualist, eliminativist and reductive views
have been put forward1. As we have seen, some take reduction in either direction to be
mistaken. Eliminativists take reductive projects to be flawed because they claim that
either the coarse-grained or the fine-grained attitudes do not exist 2. Either the coarse-
view and its norms are hopelessly wrong, or the fine view and its norms are hopelessly
wrong. The threshold connection between them falls out of the picture because there is
nothing to ‘connect’.
Dualists argue that reductive projects are flawed because they take each kind of attitude
to exists, and argue that neither attitude reduces to the other. We have two metaphysic-
ally disconnected epistemic attitudes and two canonical sets of norms thought to operate
on them; that is to say, that they reject the threshold connection between them. We will
begin by addressing eliminativist views in brief. I am not attempting to refute them —
proving that they cannot be correct is an arduous task — but I am going to give reasons
for why we should cautiously set the eliminativist question aside, or rather, insist that
they carry the burden of proof. We will then proceed to a more comprehensive look at
dualism and its attractions and associated difficulties.
5.1 Eliminativism
The first question one might ask in this debate is if both ‘belief’ and ‘confidence’ refer.
Do attitudes like credence exist at all? Those that take it that either belief or partial
belief does not exist are belief- and credal eliminativists, respectively. For defenses and
discussion of belief-eliminativism, see among others Pettigrew (2016), Stitch (1996) and
Jeffrey (1970). There are few that are confidence eliminativists, apart from those that
are sceptical of all intensional mental states such as Rosenberg (1999) and Churchland
1One can of course develop an epistemology of fine-grained attitudes without thereby being committed
to eliminativism about coarse belief, and vice versa.
2Some also argue for eliminativism of belief and credence. There are few proponents of this position (see
Jackson, 2020).
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(1981), but for arguments for credal eliminativism see among others Holton (2008) and
Horgan (2017).
Various stripes of argument have been mounted against the attitudes of belief and cre-
dence. The puzzle of chapter 4. shows that we run into difficulties in squaring the
metaphysics and the epistemology of our attitudes, but this on its own does not seem like
the sort of result that ought to have any bearing on the question of the existence of either
of the attitudes. Eliminativism does promise non-trivial theoretical benefits: If it was the
case that elimination of either the coarse or fine attitudes (or both) was successful then
this would settle the question of what norms are to apply to our believings3. If we have
no coarse-grained attitudes, then the norms that regulate coarse-grained attitudes are
thought not to apply. Conversely, if we have no fine-grained attitudes, then we cannot be
expected to have probabilistically coherent sets of same. Eliminativist views come with
the further attraction of not having to explain how elements of one attitudinal space are
related to the other. The eliminativist believes there to be at most one such space. They
are therefore rather parsimonious descriptions of our doxastic affairs; at most one kind
of attitude subject to one set of norms.
Do we see reasons to abandon beliefs or confidences? I think not. Belief and confidence
are deeply woven into our assertion- and social practices. While they might go wrong in
their details, i.e., leading us to an irrational configuration of believings when we join them
with their norms, assuming from this that there are no attitudes of the kinds in question
is an unacceptable conclusion (see Jackson, 2020; Sturgeon, 2008). As Fodor puts it,
‘[if eliminativism is true]...practically everything I believe about anything is false, and
it’s the end of the world’ (Fodor, 1989). Hyperbole aside, it would be deeply troubling
to find that the attitudes that we rely upon so readily, and that are so integral to our
conceptions of self and others, simply did not exist.
Fortunately, intuition does not side with the eliminativist: We have no grounds to dismiss
either attitude as not part of our mental lives. We appear to have some attitude that
is like belief, and we are more confident in the truth of some claims than others: Both
belief and confidence are available through introspection, we can assert what we believe,
and how confident we are in the things we believe, and so on. These are datums of
our everyday life. By appealing to beliefs, we enjoy success at explaining and predicting
behaviour we observe in ourselves and others. People who say that they believe that it will
rain will often be seen carrying umbrellas, while those who believe that taking vaccines
are somehow dangerous rarely queue up for shots. The same holds true of confidence,
and those that are confident that it will rain, and confident that vaccines are dangerous
behave predictably like those that believe the same (see Sturgeon, 2020).
3Both sets of norms could be mistaken of course, but this is a separate discussion.
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Against the attitude of credence, eliminativist arguments can gain some purchase: There
is widespread agreement that they are idealizations of attitudes actual epistemic agents
like you and me have 4. Few would argue that ‘credence’ has a place in everyday discourse,
and our practices involving belief do not for the most part seem to depend on our ability to
take a point-valued attitude: We are rarely pressed to state what our levels of confidence
in claims are with real-valued precision. Furthermore, as I showed in the coin example,
we may know what credence we ought to lend to a claim, without thereby being capable
of taking the relevant attitude. Still, one is hard-pressed to say that we do not lend
various degrees of confidence to claims, and we do appear to have a belief-like attitude
that comes in degrees (Jackson, 2019, p.61-62).
In sum, these intuitions amount to answerable objections to those that take eliminativist
positions. Those that are belief or confidence eliminativist need to provide extensive error
theories of phenomena integral to our everyday discourse, practices, and folk psychology.
The success of our practices involving belief and confidence should count against elim-
inativist views; while the attitudes may go wrong in their epistemology, we have strong
prima facie grounds to think that our psychological ontology is populated with something
a lot like beliefs, and something a lot like confidence 5. The above arguments do not rule
out the possibility of eliminativism of credence or belief, but do support the notion that
providing such an error theory will be an arduous task. We now turn to dualism.
5.2 Dualism
Seeing as we have strong prima facie grounds to think that both full belief and confidences
exist, some argue for a dualism about our believings (see e.g. Buchak, 2014; Collins,
2020; Jackson, 2019). Dualists6, treat these as self-standing doxastic attitudes; they
are ontologically and metaphysically independent. These are furnished with their own
epistemic norms, relations to other areas of philosophy etc. Such a view would allow
for the possibility of taking the attitude of ‘belief’ towards a proposition, while at the
same time lending it low confidence, or assigning it low credence. We could also lend
high credence to a claim, while disbelieving it (Jackson, 2020). This position we will call
strong dualism.
There is also the possibility of treating belief and credence as epistemic attitudes that
are correlated in certain ways, but still are metaphysically independent. We will call
this weak dualism. Still other views assume that we have use for talk of coarse and fine-
grained attitudinal spaces. In this latter sense, one is maintaining that there is a place for
4This intuition does not however prove the non-existence of the attitude of credence.
5This still leaves the possibility that they interreduce.
6Or ‘anti-reductionists’ about both belief and credence.
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the concept ‘belief’ in conversational practices and so on. We describe different aspects
of the same underlying phenomenon, referring at times simply to ‘belief’ at others to
‘confidence’ (Frankish, 2009). These latter views are not dualist, in either the weak or
the strong sense7. My target in the following is strong dualist views.
Dualism about belief and credence is appealing because it answers to intuitions we hold
about aspects of our assertoric practice. We are supposedly reluctant to make flat-out
assertions about claims for which we only have somewhat high confidence8: We likely
do not want to assert of the ticket we bought in the lottery that it lost, but we may be
highly confident that it did. If our attitudinal spaces are related such that high confidence
makes for belief, then this assertion seems infelicitous. Furthermore, there seems to be
a difference in our assertoric practices in situations in which the stakes are high, such
as in life-or-death situations, and in those that are low, such as in our assertions about
more mundane claims about everyday matters, where little turns on the veracity of our
assertions. Some claim that this difference can be attributed to the stakes involved for an
agent S in the truth of some claim, rather than the confidence the agent lends to the claim.
In effect, stakes can make us reluctant to make flat-out assertions about claims for which
our confidence is high (Christensen, 2004, pp.28-29). If this line of reasoning is correct,
we have some support for the position that our attitudinal spaces are disconnected.
The dualist can also find some empirical support for their view. Some evidence suggests
that our psychological ontology is furnished with both coarse- and fine-grained attitudes.
While more evidence is needed, a theory of belief that retains a commitment to our
practice of at times at least seeming to be operating with belief, and at other times
operating with degreed belief has support in psychological research (Weisberg, 2020).
5.3 Dualist troubles
There are two main problems with dualism that I will address. The first is that the
coarse- and fine-grained attitudes, on the assumption that they both exist, seem to be too
intimately linked to be independent phenomena. The other is a problem of metaphysical
parsimony; if either of the kinds of attitude can be tasked with all the work we commonly
take the other to do, why would we not opt for a sparser attitudinal ontology?9
The dualist is faced with the problem of having to explain why it is that if these are
self-standing epistemic attitudes, they so often march in step (see, e.g. Jackson, 2020;
7Any view that treats one attitudinal space as supervenient on or grounded in the other is not dualist
(Jackson, 2020).
8This is at least philosophical orthodoxy (see e.g. Christensen, 2004; Williamson, 2002).
9Those not of a Quinean bent could surely object to parsimony counting in favour of a given theory of
belief-like attitudes.
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Sturgeon, 2020)10. If Jones believes that he will find pizza in the freezer, it looks natural
that he would also lend high confidence to the proposition ‘there is pizza in the freezer’.
Conversely, If Jones is highly confident that his dog is upstairs, he would also quite
likely believe that his dog is upstairs. We can make the same predictions about Jones’
behaviour from being told either his beliefs or his confidences. Belief and partial belief
are in this sense hard to pry apart: In which instance where you believe something are
you not also highly confident of the truth of the thing believed? These are the types
of tensions that the dualist must be able to account for if she considers these attitudes
entirely independent of another.
The marching-in-step of belief and confidence is sometimes understated in the literature.
Take any set of things you believe. Intuitively, you could rank the members of this set
according to how confident you are in them. You do not have one set of mental facts,
your beliefs, independent of another set of mental facts, your confidences. Each time you
would take yourself to believe something you will also have some degree of strength of
that belief — your confidence — and at no time does it seem to be the case that these
properly come apart. There are belief instances paired with relatively lower confidences,
but surely there are not belief-instances where no confidences enter into the situation
somehow.
This conflicts with the dualist view. Not only do our confidences and beliefs never
seem to properly come apart, but our confidences also seem to align neatly with the
tripartite view: We are highly confident only when we are said to believe some claim,
and we believe some claim only when we are highly confident. We also disbelieve claims
only when we have low confidence in something, and lend low confidence to only those
claims we disbelieve. Those claims we are said to suspend belief about come with thick
confidence, where you are not confident of either p or ¬p, and when you lend neither high
nor low confidence, then you suspend about p. The disconnect between the attitudinal
spaces is not normally mirrored in practice other than in Lottery-type cases, and for the
most part we do not lend high confidence and disbelieve at the same time.
There are two final challenges to the dualist view that we will consider, one is called the
Bayesian challenge (Kaplan, 1996) which originally has tasked belief-first theorists with
explaining why, if credences make the same predictions as beliefs, should we need beliefs?
Belief-firsters have run this challenge in the other direction, what Jackson (2020) calls
the ‘Belief-first’ challenge: Why should we assume that credence and probability beliefs
are separate entities that do not inter-reduce? We will take up this challenge in the next
section. The dualist is then faced with the arduous task of accounting for the respective
10Marching in step is by some taken to license a sort of weak dualism, where the attitudes of belief and
credence are related in some way that is not strictly reductive in either direction.
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belief- and credence-dividends in our analyses. What work does ‘belief’ do that is not
done by ‘credence’, and conversely, what work does ‘credence’ do that is not done by
‘belief’?
The answers to these questions amount to much the same as the criticism levied against
belief-as-credence and credence-as-belief views, but as we will see, we have reason to think
that the criticisms are apt when targeted at credence-as-belief views, but not against those
views that treat belief as a species of confidence. As we have seen that eliminativism
about belief and credence is implausible, and dualism about belief and credence is not
sustainable, a major upshot of these conclusions is that if we can rule out those theories
that seek to reduce credence to belief, then we are left with some reductive account
that take our fine-grained attitudes, whatever they may be, to be metaphysically more
fundamental. Facts about coarse-grained attitudes come for free once we have settled the
facts about the fine-grained attitudes (Sturgeon, 2020, p.242)
5.4 Which features should a model of belief have?
The remaining candidate theories of our belief-like attitudes are all reductive theories.
In this section, I will discuss what a successful such theory ought to look like. As the
aspiration of this thesis is to accurately describe the belief-like attitudes had by human
persons, the most important feature is that it should possess psychological plausibility.
A view of belief that does not track our use of the term or our experience as beings that
have belief-like attitudes does not provide a satisfying description of belief. We have seen
that eliminativism about each kind of attitude is not sustainable, so an adequate theory
of belief must take to heart a realism about coarse and fine attitudes.
Secondly, it must address the marching-in-step phenomenon. Whenever we take it to
be the case that someone behaves a certain way because they believe something, we
also recognize that we could predict their behaviour from being told that they lend high
confidence to the thing believed, and vice versa. There are no instances where our coarse
and fine attitudes properly come apart, and this calls for explanation. We should not be
satisfied with any view that cannot account for this phenomenon in a graceful way. Both
coarse and fine-grained attitudes appear to play a role in our mental lives, and some role
in our rationalizing about our epistemic circumstances.
We must also account for why it is that we so easily slip in and out of talk of belief as
a phenomenon that appears to be categorical — things we say we simply ‘believe’ —
and belief as a phenomenon that comes in degrees; we are more confident of the truth of
some of our beliefs than in others. I simply believe that Oslo is the capital of Norway,
but I am more confident in the proposition ‘It will be more rainy days than sunny days
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in Bergen during the fall of 2021’ than ‘It will be more sunny days than rainy days in
Bergen during the fall of 2021’. Our theory must respect the talk of ‘belief’, ‘disbelief’,
and ‘suspended belief’, as well as ‘confidences’ as these are woven into our practices
involving the attitudes.
We will rely on the Nature-before-norms assumption quite heavily. If a theory of belief
has the features required for our most common approaches to rationality to work, that
would be desirable, but this is secondary to working out its metaphysics. A theory that
appeals to attitudes that do not find its home in our psychological ontology is not an
adequate description of our attitudes, even if appeal to such kinds can provide powerful
tools in reasoning about rationality. That is to say that we aim to get the ontology of
belief right, even if this has implications for our epistemologies.
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6 Credence-as-belief
This chapter will deal with belief-first views. On these views, credence and its relatives
are treated as derivative of outright belief (Frankish, 2009). That is to say, that credence
or confidence can be lent to a content by believing some related content (Sturgeon, 2015).
In other words, you lend credence or confidence by believing something.
There are few that hold the view that credence or other graded belief reduces to outright
belief, but one such theory is defended by Jackson and Moon (2020). I will treat their
belief-first view as a stand-in for belief-first views that locates the lending of credence or
confidence in the content of the thing believed. I will show that their theory falls prey to
common criticism levied against theories of this kind. The criticisms against belief-first
theories are usually taken to be decisive. As we have already dismissed dualism about
belief and credence, and carefully set aside the elimination question, this will leave us with
some form of credence- or confidence-first view looking like the only remaining options.
6.1 Main strategies: Content and update-disposition
Credence-as-belief theories claim that credences reduce to belief. They accept that there
is a place for fine-grained mental states in our epistemic lives, and seek to explain these
by appealing to the coarse-grained states of belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief,
which they see as explanatorily (and metaphysically) more fundamental. There are two
main strategies for such reduction. One is to look to the role of belief, and match some
aspect of the role of belief to credal strength. The other is to reduce the credal strength
of any token belief to some aspect of the content of that belief (Frankish, 2009; Jackson,






A credence in Φ to degree n is treated as nothing other than a belief that somehow
involves Φ and n (Sturgeon, 2020, p.233). What the credence-as-belief theorist is trying
to account for is how our belief-theoretic situation grounds the strength of credence n
lent to Φ in a way that individuates between credence and other attitudes one might take
to Φ. Different beliefs are individuated by reference to the content Φ, but what makes a
n-level credence in Φ different from another attitude one might take to Φ is supposed to
be its strength. As Sturgeon (2020, p.234) puts it:
‘What’s distinctive about n-level credence in Φ vis-à-vis those other attitudes
is its strength - the n-bit, so to say - the fact that the attitude in question is n%
of certainty strength-wise. This aspect of the attitude must shine through any
Φ-indexed belief-theoretic situation if it’s credibly to ground n-level credence
in Φ.’
This holds true of any claim lent credence n, and so we see that to cash out credence on a
belief-first account, outright belief must somehow encode information about the strength
of belief.
6.1.1 Credence as update-disposition
To locate credal strength in the role of belief is often understood as cashing out degreed
belief as a sort of update-disposition; those beliefs that we would say come with high
credence are actually full beliefs that are stable in face of incoming evidence or other
factors that might make us abandon such a belief (Sturgeon, 2020, pp. 233-234). That is




As evidence for or against the truth of p trickles in, our disposition to update that belief
supposedly changes. Harman’s (1986) view fits in the schema. He claims that what we
call ‘degreed belief’ is really a marker of how strongly held any given belief is. On his
theory beliefs are an either/or affair — you either take or fail to take the relevant attitude




up some of them than others2. In other words, high credence is understood as reluctance
to relinquish a belief in face of incoming information.
These and similar views represent what I take to be the weaker strand of theory of belief-
first views. Harman’s theory has the problem that in order to have some attitude that
somehow incorporates a notion of degrees to speak of, one would first have to believe
some proposition p. What are we to make of low or middling credence or confidence on
such a picture?3 One would first have to have an outright belief in p in order to have some
low credence in p, i.e., figure out that one was quite happy to abandon p or substitute it
for strong attachment in ¬p4. Suspended belief is not just belief that is neither strongly
nor weakly held, but you would still have to believe p in order to suspend belief that p,
and so suspended belief fits uneasily within the theory. Furthermore, something seems
intuitively a bit stilted if by ‘I believe p more strongly than q’, you are describing a lesser
disposition to update on p than y. Degreed belief seems to be a less complicated affair
than this.
These are common problems for theories of this kind: The theories conflate an agent’s
attitude taken to the content of some proposition p, and the disposition to use that
content for updating the agent’s belief (Frankish, 2009; Sturgeon, 2020). Surely, an
attitude taken towards content and a disposition to update one’s believings with that
content are distinct mental phenomena. Lending credence or confidence to p cannot just
be believing p insofar as evidence has not disposed you to the contrary. This is a general
feature of, and problem for, belief-as-update-disposition-theories and for this reason they
are not feasible. Locating credence or other degreed belief in the content of what is
believed is a more promising strategy.
6.1.2 Credence as content
My emphasis in the following will be on those belief-first theories that seek to reduce
credence to belief by way of the content of belief. These belief-first views escapes the
problems associated with locating degreed belief in the degree to which the belief is firmly
held, makes one disposed to update one’s belief and so on.
Moon and Jackson’s (2020) credence-as-belief theory is a compelling such view, and as
we will see, something not unlike their theory will be woven into my simple confidence
account. Their theory of belief starts with a common-sense explanation of how credence
relates to belief: A credence of .6 lent to the proposition ‘It will rain tomorrow’ is really
2The degrees of attachment need not be explicit, and they may be imprecise (Harman, 1986)
3Harman (1986) makes no mention of middling or low confidence.
4For discussion, see Frankish, 2009; Sturgeon, 2020
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just a belief, the content of which is something like the proposition ‘It is 60 percent likely
that it will rain tomorrow’, or some proposition that has similar content.
There are two main ways of locating credal strength in belief in this way. The first, and
the one that is more demanding on part of the theory, is to say that credence just is
probability-belief. Lending .7 credence to any proposition p just is believing something
like ‘The probability of p is .7’. The other way is to cash out credence by way of epistemic
modals. This is Moon and Jackson’s (2020) approach. They introduce the variable ‘M’,
that ranges over epistemic modals such as ‘It is probable that’, ‘very probably...’, ‘It is
.4 likely that’ and so on. Importantly, ‘M’ also ranges over non-probabilistic epistemic
modals, where ‘it might rain’ is parsed as ‘there is some non-zero probability that it
will rain’. This allows the view to account for vagueness and lack of precise credence.
Furthermore, they let the variable ‘X’ range over real numbers and subintervals in the
unit interval [0,1] inclusive. The resulting view is thus:
Belief first: For S to have X degree credence that p just is for S to believe Mp
(where X and M correspond to eachother). (Moon & Jackson, 2020, p.654)
This entails what they call the ‘Biconditional’:
Biconditional: S has X degree of credence that p iff S believes Mp (where X
and M correspond to each other)
Biconditional is the weaker claim, and maintains only that credence and modal beliefs
are coextensive across worlds. With Belief first they are making the stronger claim that
credence just is modal belief. Allowing for non-probabilistic epistemic modals means that
their view is not committed to any one interpretation of probability, such as frequentism
or subjectivism, which has been a common criticism targeted at such views(Christensen,
2004; Moon & Jackson, 2020). The probability that their view seeks to capture by
probabilistic epistemic modals is simply epistemic probability : Relative to some claim p,
p is said to be probable for S if p is consistent with the evidence S has for that claim5.
This leaves open the possibility of lending confidence to p by modally believing, even in
the absence of certainty of what probability S ought to assign to p (see Moon & Jackson,
2020; Staffel, 2013)




6.2 Why credence does not reduce to belief.
In the following, I will show why we should be reluctant to accept belief-first theories as
satisfying accounts of our doxastic affairs: It is questionable that unsophisticated agents
have either probability-beliefs or modal beliefs. Furthermore, a degree of belief in p can
scale up and down, while p remains the same. Belief-first views cannot account for this.
As a consequence, they duplicate our doxastic efforts. Finally, a major attraction of
belief-first is that belief can serve as an attitudinal ruling-out of the negation of some
claim p. This commits belief-firsters to maintain that we believe only that for which we
are certain.
6.2.1 Attractions of belief-first
Belief-first theorists have some strong intuitions to offer in support of their view. For our
purposes, the most important attraction of Belief first is that is provides a story of the
relationship between our attitudinal spaces, and that it respects some of our intuitions
regarding our attitudes. As belief is very much an attitude we recognize, their view seems
eminently psychologically plausible6. Our social and assertion practices, epistemology and
other areas of philosophy are all shot through with the notion that belief is a categorical
affair, and if a belief-first account is correct we avoid having to deal with the implications
of our belief-like attitudes being other than what they have normally been conceived as.
A further attraction of belief-first views is that belief is the sort of thing that can be
appealed to when taking a stand towards some claim: When you make an assertion such
as ‘It is sunny outside.’ you do not leave the possibility that it is not sunny outside
open. If you had high credence for the proposition you asserted, this would still be a
live possibility 7. It is at least plausible that this taking a stand that p is in some sense
stronger than lending credence or confidence to p.
Finally, one of the major attractions of any view that is not dualist is that it posits
sparser doxastic resources; it is more simple to not have to deal with two epistemic tools.
At root, there is only one attitude, belief.
6.2.2 Unsophisticated agents do not have modal beliefs
On the stronger iteration of belief-first views, credence just is belief about the probabilities
of the truth of some claim; probability-beliefs. Any advocate of such an account is faced
6For further discussion of the merits of theirs and similar views, see (Jackson, 2019, 2020; Moon &
Jackson, 2020).
7Coherent credence of .99 in the proposition ‘It is sunny outside’ comes with a .01 credence that it is not
(Jackson, 2021)
CHAPTER 6. CREDENCE-AS-BELIEF
with the problem of accounting for how people that had no knowledge of probability
theory — that is, anyone living before the 17th century — went about forming credence
or degreed belief (Wedgwood, 2012). If one instead advocate a modal-operator view, such
as Moon and Jackson’s, then one has an easier time of accounting for how credence and
belief are related. Still, it appears that unsophisticated agents — children and animals
— have attitudes that are akin to confidences or credence, without the requisite grasp of
epistemic modals (see e.g. Jackson, 2019).
A child might ask one parent instead of the other if they can stay up for half an hour
longer, being more confident that one is more likely to say yes than the other. Intuition
does not support the notion that this is because the child has a belief on the form Mp,
but rather that they simply are more confident that one parent will say yes. The same
holds true of some sophisticated animals, such as a dog that approaches aunt Jen rather
than uncle Greg because uncle Greg was not generous at all with the treats the last time
they visited and so on8. No epistemic modals or probability-beliefs appear to be involved
in the case of children and sophisticated non-human animals being more confident in
some things (claims in the case of those agents that can grasp claims), than others.
6.2.3 Credence attaches to content
On Belief first and other accounts of this kind, there is just one fundamental attitude,
that of belief. One can form an outright belief that is not modal, i.e., simply a belief
that p. To form a credence about the content of p, one must form a new belief, Mp.
What one cannot do is form a belief in p and a credence in p at the same time (Jackson,
2019). As evidence for or against some p comes in, to alter one’s credence that p in light
of that evidence, on Belief first one will continuously be forming new modal beliefs. It
is not that your confidence or credence simply changes, but that you form new beliefs
Mp, where M changes. There is intuitively something wrong with such a picture.
If asked about your confidence in some claim, your answer is likely that of the confidence
you lend to the proposition. Something seems wrong if, in order to answer the question
about your confidence in the claim, you had to form a modal belief that involved the
claim (Jackson, 2019). Furthermore, when confronted with evidence that changes our
attitude towards some claim, we do not seem to be forming new modal beliefs involving
them: Say you lent roughly 90% confidence to a claim p. After seeing some evidence that
counts against the truth of p you now lend only roughly 80% confidence to the claim.
On Belief first you do this by believing something like ‘p is about 80% likely’. Now, as
we ponder evidence, our confidence in some claim can shift up or down, but we do not
8This exhibits behaviour that at least resembles what I call confidences, without there necessarily being
an attitude that would fully amount to propositional belief in the way humans are capable of.
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necessarily form new beliefs along the way; p remains the same, but our attitude to p
changes. On Belief first there can be no such attitudinal change: The only attitude is
one of belief in p, and you would have to revise your attitude to p by forming new beliefs
with new content, that involved p.
6.2.4 Modal beliefs are duplicate efforts.
Belief first provides a story of why it is that our beliefs and confidences go together;
we ‘build in’ strength of belief in our full beliefs. This seems simple enough, but it turns
out that this duplicates our doxastic efforts. Belief first posits only one fundamental
attitude, belief. That should make its attitudinal ontology less densely populated than a
dualist view. However, it does not look like it is in fact a more parsimonious view than
dualism: On this theory we have outright beliefs — non-modal beliefs — and in order
to lend credence, we will also have to have modal beliefs. In order for our coarse- and
fine attitudes to march in step, we would therefore have (at least) two beliefs about each
claim we had the attitude of belief towards: There is the attitude taken to p by believing,
and the attitude taken to p by modally believing Mp. Belief first trades complexity at
the level of attitude with complexity at the level of content (Jackson, 2019).
6.3 Belief does not require certainty
The final problem with belief-first views that I will address is that the attitudinal ‘ruling-
out’ of options that is considered an attraction of these sorts of views implies that we
are committed to certainty. In epistemological orthodoxy, belief is the sort of thing that
can be relied upon in further reasoning, you take it as the case that p. Another way to
put this is that when you believe p outright you rule out all possible worlds where ¬p is
the case (Buchak, 2014). If it is a necessary feature of belief that it is to serve as this
attitudinal ruling-out of ¬p, you thereby cannot account for why it seems the case that
we are more or less confident in claims we believe outright (Wedgwood, 2012).
If the marker of belief is that it can be relied upon in reasoning, and this in turn requires
certainty, then for a view like Belief first the resulting structure of beliefs would be
something like ‘certainly Mp’. Intuition does not support this: Much as you are liberal
in dealings with utterances of the form ‘I believe X’, where X is almost any statement
whatever that you are quite confident of, you are also likely to reserve ‘I am certain of
X’ for those utterances that are about a claim for which your confidence is very high9.
9We might admit a wider expanse of attitudes in the ‘certainty-bracket’ than those that would get
credence 1, in our assertoric and other practices.
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Having argued against eliminativism about our belief-like attitudes, and against dualist-
and belief-first views, we are left with views that ground belief in credence, or in other
degreed attitudes. The most common are the ‘credence-first’ or ‘belief-as-credence views’.
I will show that credence-first views can make good on the link between the coarse and
fine-grained attitudes in a series of ways. In the next chapter, I will show that confidences
can do a better job still
This chapter will do many things at once. We will introduce credence-first views and
see how these relate to aspects of Sturgeon’s confidence-view of our believings. Sturgeon
maintains that cognitive forces makes for attitudes that are functionally identical to cre-
dences and credal sets; he calls these point-valued confidence and sharp thick confidence.
The force-based view contains within it two types of confidence, one that comes with
real-valued precision, and one that does not. My general strategy for this chapter is to
present credence-first models of belief, show how the real-valued attitudes on Sturgeon’s
confidence-account are generated by cognitive forces, and then show why such attitudes
are insufficient for accounting for our doxastic affairs. As point-valued confidence and
thick confidence are functionally identical to credence and credal sets, the criticism tar-
geted at them should be apt to also show why Sturgeon gets this part of his story of
belief wrong.
Credence-first views come in two varieties: Threshold views, and those that take belief
to be credence 1, and disbelief to be credence 0, which I will call non-threshold views.
Non-threshold views will be discussed and dismissed before turning to threshold views.
I will then motivate the Lockean threshold account of belief. We will look at a view
we will call credal-based-Lockeanism, and then turn to Sturgeon’s (2020) force-based
confidence-view. I will then show why it is the case that views that rely on credence
cannot accurately describe belief-like attitudes had by human persons.
7.1 Belief as credence 1.
One way of grounding the coarse-grained attitudes in their fine-grained relatives is to take
belief to be credence 1, disbelief to be credence 0 and suspension of belief as somewhere
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around credence .5. Despite appearances, this can be compatible with credal-based-
Lockeanism, as the views will coincide if the threshold for ‘belief’ is set at 1. Such views
have been defended by, among others, Clarke (2013), Wedgewood (2012), and Greco
(2015). Greco and Wedgewood both see reason to identify ‘belief’ with credence 1, i.e.,
maximal confidence. Wedgewood (2012) argues that it is a function of belief that it
should align with the normative requirements of outright belief. That is to say, that the
function of belief is a sort of disposition towards deductive cogency. In order for the
norms of rationality of outright belief to operate on credence, ‘belief’ needs to coincide
with credence 1, in which case your beliefs can be subject to the conjunction and the
entailment rule. Beliefs can also, by this stipulation, be probabilistically coherent (Greco,
2015)1.
We will not go over the finer points of these views. They have been criticized on the
grounds that they conflict with the datum that we believe some things more strongly
than others. This cannot be the case if all and only those propositions we lend maximal
confidence are beliefs. For this reason, most reductive theories that ground belief in some
version of confidence or credence are threshold theories (Jackson, 2020).
7.2 Credal-based-Lockeanism
On all credence-first views the coarse-grained attitudes of belief, disbelief, and suspension
of belief are nothing but ‘credence in the rough’ (Sturgeon, 2020, p.255). The coarse-
grained attitudes grow metaphysically from their finer-grained relatives.
Threshold theories, such as credal-based-Lockeanism (CBL), ground the coarse-grained
attitudes in the fine-grained attitudes in a particular way: Belief is nothing but credence
above some threshold; sufficiently strong credence. The same goes for disbelief, which is
nothing but credence below some antithreshold, and suspension of belief, that is nothing
but those credences that are middling, in some roundabout sense. The Lockean thesis on
belief, a name coined by Foley (1992) says that having a belief that X is to meet some
threshold s of subjective probability lent to X that need not be 1 (Leitgeb, 2017, p.44),
that is:
Lockean thesis: Bel(X) iff P (X) > s.
We should make clear that a threshold view and a Lockean view of belief are not the
same: The threshold view is concerned with the relationship between outright and degreed
belief, where one is said to believe p only if one’s credence in p meets some threshold
1If one is also logically omniscient and so on.
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x. The Lockean view is concerned with the rationality of believing p relative to some
threshold y. That is to say that while the threshold view is interested in the relationship
between belief and degrees of belief, the Lockean view is concerned with the relationship
between rational belief and rational degrees of belief. If you endorse both a Lockean and
a threshold view, it is common to take x and y to coincide (Clarke, 2013).
7.2.1 Fixed vs. relative thresholds.
There are two approaches to what the threshold for belief ought to be: A fixed and
a context-relative threshold. We should opt for the latter. If one insisted that there
was a fixed rather than a context-variable threshold, one would find oneself in a familiar
dialectic: In some cases, it would be too stringent to capture what we ordinarily would call
the coarse-grained attitude ‘belief’. For assertions about mundane states of facts about
the world, a .999 threshold would be too strict, for instance. We would be believing what
we asserted only if we were getting quite close to certain about the truth of a claim p.
Many, perhaps most, of our beliefs would fall short of this threshold certainty-wise, and
so a threshold of .999 would be too stringent a requirement on belief. In other instances,
a given threshold could be too lax: When considering whether or not to build and to
turn on the Large Hadron Collider, we would not accept a threshold of .8 for belief in
the proposition p ‘the collision of atoms will not create a black hole’. We would insist
that when scientists asserted that they ‘believed it would be fine’, they were rather more
confident than 80% certain. In both cases, we are dealing with a threshold set ad hoc,
and we should not be content with this.
A further problem is that common sense does not allow for a fixed, invariant threshold.
Say we took the threshold of belief to be 95%. As one moves beyond .5 towards credence
1, one is dealing with credence that at some point could be called ‘belief’. .5 credence
marks perfect indeterminacy between whether or not ¬p or p, and so the threshold for
‘belief’ would have to be somewhere in the subinterval (.5,1]. .95 could well be a fine
threshold. As we stipulated that belief was any credence ≥.95, we would then be at pains
to explain why it could not be credence .949 instead.
Make the change to the threshold an arbitrary but infinitesimally small n. We would
not say that any such change to the threshold was substantive; an infinitesimally small
n cannot be what separates our beliefs from suspended belief, any more than a strand
of hair separates a man who is balding from one who is not. This process could in
principle continue by infinitesimally small increments until the threshold was set at some
unit-real n for which we would decidedly say that the subinterval for ‘belief’ was no
longer appropriate. In other words, by sorites reasoning we see that a contextually
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invariable threshold is not appropriate2. While you could give reasons for why belief
should be set at some fixed threshold n, invariantism about thresholds does not track our
practices involving belief. These factors taken together makes a precise, context-invariable
threshold view untenable.
A more promising strategy is to opt for a contextually variable threshold. Much as I would
be relatively tall in most parts of Asia, I would be short in the NBL, and the relative-
threshold views operates in a similar fashion. In some contexts, we would be vary to call
those propositions to which we lent relatively lower credence ‘beliefs’, whereas in others,
we would be happy to do so. There is nothing more to ‘belief’ than lending sufficiently
high credence to an object of belief on CBL. There is also nothing more to disbelief
than lending sufficiently low credence. Those credences that are not sufficiently high











Figure 4: Credal-based-Lockeanism, an illustration Sturgeon, 2020, p.256.
7.2.2 Upshots of CBL
We have reason to think that CBL gets a lot right about how our attitudinal spaces
are related. The first upshot of CBL is that it preserves realism about both coarse and
fine-grained attitudes, and so it dismisses eliminativism about either. Grounding the
former attitude in the latter offers a story of how the metaphysics of the two spaces are
integrated. CBL respects our talk and practices involving ‘belief’ and so on. We have an
explanation for why it is that we seem to believe some things more strongly than others,
which is precisely what we would expect from a threshold account where the threshold
2See Hyde and Raffman, 2018.
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is less than certainty. On such a picture, my believing that it will rain tomorrow more
strongly than you after seeing the same weather report is not nonsensical as it would be
had belief been an attitude you either take or fail to take. It is explained by appeal to me
lending the proposition higher credence, but each of us meeting the threshold for belief.
Furthermore, it has some success at preserving our intuitions that the coarse- and fine-
grained attitudes march in step. On CBL, we can predict and explain our own and
each other’s behaviours by way of ‘belief’ or ‘disbelief’, but also ‘high credence’ and ‘low
credence’. This is because CBL treats ‘belief’, ‘disbelief’ and ‘suspension of belief’ as
conceptually proximal determinates of credence. Believing is one way to instatiate the
attitude of high credence, and the same holds true for disbelief and low credence:
There is likewise causal (or at least becaus-al) harmony between conceptu-
ally proximal determinable and determinate. Things happen because people
believe; and sometimes but not always this is so because people lend 95% cre-
dence. Things happen because people lend 95% credence; and sometimes but
not always this is so only because they lend exactly that credence (Sturgeon,
2020, p.258).
Conceptually proximal determinates and determinables differ only at the level of grain,
and so they are in something of a causal harmony (Sturgeon, 2020, pp.258-259). As we
will see later, ‘suspended belief’ cannot be accounted for on CBL, but for ‘belief’ and
‘disbelief’ CBL provides a pleasing story of the integration of our fine and coarse attitudes:
We are said to ‘believe’ only when we lend sufficiently high credence, ‘disbelieve’ only
when we lend sufficiently low credence, and we therefore have a ready explanation for
why they seem to go together most of the time. Together, this makes for a great deal of
good news associated with credence first views. In the next section, we will see how CBL
relates to aspects of Sturgeon’s force-based Lockeanism (FBL).
7.3 Sturgeon’s take
Sturgeon (2020) sees our coarse-grained attitudes grounded in confidence. Confidences of
various strengths are brought about by the cognitive forces of attraction, repulsion and
neutrality. When these combine in harmonious mixtures, you achieve functional stability
points; this is the attitude of confidence. Note that confidences are not explanatorily basic
states on his theory. Rather, it is the cognitive forces that make for the infinite number
of confidences that we lend to claims as a function of responsiveness to epistemic reasons,
e.g., evidence of various sorts. While confidence can take different degrees of precision, the
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threshold framework remains largely unchanged from CBL. Sturgeon’s confidence-based
threshold view of believings weaves a point-valued attitude that is functionally identical
to credence, and one that is functionally identical to a credal set into his framework:
I assume here without argument that there are two kinds of confidence to be
woven into the force-based framework. One is familiar point-valued credence
idealized in Bayesian epistemology. The other is thick confidence idealized in
various generalizations of the Bayesian framework (Sturgeon, 2020, p.277).
There are in effect two kinds of confidence on his picture. The first kind closely resembles
credence, and represent the doxastic attitude you take when you are exactly 70% sure
that a ball picked at random from a box containing 70 red and 30 blue balls will be
red. The second is thick confidence. Thick confidence again subdivides into two different
kinds; one that is akin to credal sets, i.e., a credence-function that takes each possible
credence assignment in any given interval as values, and simple thick confidence. Their
difference is best illustrated by the attitudes of being exactly 60-70% sure of the truth of
some claim, and being simply very confident or quite confident, not confident and so on.
The former kind is what Sturgeon calls ‘sharp thick confidence’; an interval of confidences
that have sharp boundaries. Only point-valued and sharp-tick confidence models well3.
Simple confidences as I defined them are attitudes that have no real-valued precision, and
he maintains that this is because they are essentially vague phenomena. Furthermore,
they are all species of thick confidence, as we will see.
We begin with his view of how point-valued confidence is related to credence. Any
credence is generated by mixtures of the cognitive forces of attraction and repulsion only.
Neutrality is anathema to credence — no precision springs from the absence of an effective
epistemic reason for a claim — so for every mixture of attraction and repulsion he takes
it that there is a nil component of neutrality. Point-valued confidences, like credences,
are represented with real numbers in the unit interval, and he says that two things are
true of them (Sturgeon, 2020, pp.276-278):
• For any point-valued confidence represented by unit-real n there is exactly zero
neutrality.
• The strength of the cognitive force of attraction equals n/(n− 1) multiplied by the
strength of the repulsion component involved.
3The framework of his model is found in Sturgeon, 2020, pp.279-281. The details of which are not
important for our purposes.
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Say your mixture of cognitive force contains exactly .7 parts attraction4. With a nil com-
ponent neutrality, you would then have .7
(1−.7) times .3 repulsion, which of course equals
credence of .7. There are two degenerate cases of point-valued confidence, confidence
1 and confidence 0. These contain mixtures of 100% attraction and a nil-component
of repulsion and neutrality, and 100% repulsion and a nil-component of attraction and







Figure 5: Credence as confidence.
To extend this model to include thick confidence, he simply adds in neutrality. Thick
confidence is generated from a mixture of cognitive attraction, repulsion and neutrality
is whatever measure where neutrality is > 0. For any sharp thick confidence, let [l, u]








Figure 6: Sharp thick confidence.
As we see, point-valued credence and sharp thick confidence can be generated from mix-
tures of cognitive force. They also easily fold into a Lockean scheme: Sufficiently strong
confidence makes for belief, sufficiently weak confidence for disbelief, and sufficiently
thick confidence for suspended belief. Those confidences that are sufficiently strong are
precisely those brought about by stable configurations of cognitive forces in mixtures
dominated by attraction. For disbelief, it is precisely those that stable configurations
of force in mixtures dominated by repulsion. Finally, suspended beliefs are those that
are dominated by neutrality. This aspect of his theory closely resembles a credence-first
view, and as such some of the criticisms of the following sections are also a criticism of
this part of his theory.
4You could just as well think of this as 70% out of a total mixture consisting of 100%
5Which are rather odd mixtures.
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7.4 Problems for CBL and FBL
CBL makes good on the promise that it can ground the attitudes of belief and disbelief
in credence above and below thresholds. Point-valued confidence is functionally identical
to credence, and so this aspect of FBL operates in a similar fashion. There are some
worries associated with views that take credence or credal sets to be attitudes we ground
the coarse-grained attitudes in, and we will look at three of them. As we will see, they
are closely related. The central worry is that credence as a point-valued attitude does not
find home in our psychology. That is, on the assumption that human persons manifest
features, and that some of these features are belief-like attitudes, we ought to be wary of
any theory that identifies these attitudes with credence.
This is related to the second worry: That credence is insufficient to account for our
doxastic affairs. CBL cannot account for all the belief-like attitudes we can take, and
ought to take, in light of our evidential situations. Credence is said to be a specific, but
not an accurate representation of our believings, a fact we will make much of in the next
chapter. The final worry we will look at is that there is no good way to ground the
coarse-grained attitude of suspension of belief in credence. Sturgeon’s model does not
see point-valued confidence as an attitude that can make for suspension of belief, and so
this criticism is targeted at CBL only. In the following, I will let ‘credence’ range over
credence and point-valued confidence, and ‘credal set(s)’ range over credal sets and thick
confidence.
7.4.1 The worries from psychology
CBL grounds the coarse-grained attitudes in the fine-grained attitudes in a particular
way, and the view maintains that the following three biconditionals are true:
(B) Belief ⇐⇒ High credence
(D) Disbelief ⇐⇒ Low credence
(S) Suspended belief ⇐⇒ Middling credence.
As we have seen, belief is credence above a threshold, disbelief credence below an anti-
threshold and suspended belief middling credence. The left-to-right directions of these
biconditionals are all false, however (see e.g. Sturgeon, 2020). The reason why these bicon-




Consider how confident you are that it will rain tomorrow. It may be that you find it
close to 70% likely, but it is highly unlikely that you would assume that it was precisely
70% certain that it would rain. No hyper-precise attitude is called for, nor do we take
it as a defect in our attitude that it is not precise in this way: This holds true of any
situation in which you lend confidence that is about n percent strength-wise, where it is
not a requirement on the attitude you take that it exhibit unit-real precision. Some take
this to be an aspect of how we interact with evidence. Situations in which we are to lend
credence or confidence only rarely (if ever) demand that we do so with the precision of
credence given the evidence (Sturgeon, 2020, p.270).
The ‘standard’ reply to the worries from psychology has been that precise credence can
be imprecisely modelled by regions of credal space, what is sometimes called credal sets
or ‘spread-out’ credence (see e.g. Lyon, 2017; Staffel, 2020; Sturgeon, 2020). By appeal
to such sets, one can capture aspects of the imprecise character of the evidence we are
presented with, while still being able to model the attitude in question. One could then
imagine being 60-70% certain of the truth of some claim, i.e., lend all the possible credence
functions in the interval. As we will see in the following section, this does not solve our
problem because we for the most part rationalize a take on things that is more coarse-
grained than credence and credal sets allows for, but still more granular than outright
belief.
7.4.2 The sufficiency question
The second worry we will consider further cements the psychological worry. This is due
not only to credence’ precise nature, but also to the situations in which we are to lend
credence. In certain contexts, precise credence is not an appropriate attitude to take,
given the evidence that is available to you to form credence (Lyon, 2017). Yet we still
take some attitude, that is not credence. Therefore, credence does not suffice to describe
our doxastic affairs.
In certain contexts you ought to take an attitude that is coarser than credence6. This is
what Sturgeon (2020, p.270) calls the ‘Norm of Character Match’, which stipulates that
the attitude you take must match the evidence available for you to take that attitude.
Others take a similar approach, and assume some such norm to constrain the kinds of
attitudes we can take (see e.g. Lyon, 2017). We will see that certain contexts also demand
that you take an attitude that is even coarser still than what can be captured by a credal
set, but that this is not the only reason for avoiding this approach to a lack of evidence
to make for credence.
6Some assume that rationality demands that one take an attitude that is coarser than credence, namely
a credal set whereas others think that these permits that one takes any credence in the credal set (see
e.g. Jeffrey, 1987; Lyon, 2017)
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In the following scenarios7, an agent S is tasked with considering if she should bring
an umbrella with her on her way to work tomorrow. She looks at the weather report.
The weather station is a special one, and it reports weather after particularly advanced
statistical models. It states the certainty with which the weather will be as reported with
zero chance of error on their part, i.e., if they say that it will rain with 90% chance, then
the chance of rain actually is 90%.
• Weather Report 1: The weather report says that there is precisely 70% chance
of rain in Bergen tomorrow. S knows this, and nothing else.
What credence should S have that it will rain tomorrow? The plausible verdict in this
case is that S should be 70 percent confident that it will rain. This scenario captures
relevant aspects of credence, where there is a precise credence available for S, even though
S may not be able to take such an attitude.
In altering the setup slightly, we see that precise credence is not appropriate in all contexts
due to the evidence we have available:
• Weather Report 2: The weather report for tomorrow says that it is exactly 75-85
percent of rain in Bergen. S knows this, and nothing else.
What is the appropriate credence S should have that it will rain? In this scenario, point-
valued credence would not be appropriate in light of the evidence S has that it will rain.
S should be exactly 75-85 percent confident it will rain, and her attitude should be the
attitude represented by the credal set [.75,.85], what we also refer to as thick confidence
(Sturgeon, 2008, p.156).
As we make the evidence available to S less precise still, investing precise credence or
thick confidence in the proposition that it will rain seems less and less plausible.
• Weather Report 3: The weather report for tomorrow says that it is approximately
65-75 percent chance of rain in Bergen, and approximately 25-35 that it will not. S
knows this and nothing else.
What is an appropriate confidence S should have that it will rain? Here there seems to
be no possibility that S’s attitude is one of credence or thick confidence. The appropriate
attitude to take in light of the evidence is one of roughly 65-75 percent confidence that
it will rain8.
7This example is inspired by (Sturgeon, 2008, 2020).
8Some think that S’s attitude could be representable by some vague region of credal space, v[.65, .75]
(see e.g. Rinard, 2017; Sturgeon, 2020).
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Further variations on the Weather Report show that neither credence nor credal sets do
a good job at capturing our attitudes in light of our evidence. They also show that while
we can no longer arrange our attitudes along an absolute numerical scale, our degreed
attitudes admit of ordinal structure.
• Weather report 4: The setup is identical as in Weather Report 1-3 with the
variations that S knows the following, and nothing else:
i There is slightly more chance of rain than not.
ii There is a solid chance of rain, but it is not guaranteed that it will rain.
iii There is a very solid chance of rain, but not guaranteed that it will rain.
iv It will definitely rain.
The rational confidence S ought to take towards the proposition that it will rain can be
ordered like this:
50% - Coni.(R) < Conii.(R) < Coniii.(R) < Coniv.(R) = 100%
The upshot of these examples is that they show that many situations do not come with the
requisite evidence to support taking a point-valued or interval-valued attitude. Common
sense recognizes that we take attitudes that are coarser than what these allow for, a lot
or perhaps most of the time. Even under idealizations, the evidence with which we are
presented do not always make for a hyper-precise attitude.
The standard reply to the lack of precision in our evidence is to appeal to credal sets, and
at times credal sets with vague endpoints. This does not escape this problem. In the case
of a standard credal set, you take all the credence functions in some interval. While this
allows you to take an attitude representing all the credence functions say in the interval
[.6,.7], by what means do you choose a smallest and largest member of the set? In the
setup where the endpoints are known this is not problematic, but credal sets are supposed
to capture aspects of vagueness in our evidence. We run into the same problem we do with
credence, where the endpoints are hyper-precise, and in many cases they also appear to
be picked arbitrarily. Now if you approach credal sets by some approach to vagueness, say
a supervaluationist approach, the arbitrariness (and hyper-precision) resurfaces in where
you make the cut-off between admissible and inadmissible precisifications of your doxastic
state9. This is called the problem of higher-order vagueness: you shift the precision for
the cut-off of membership in the credal set around, but you are still committed to drawing
a sharp boundary where intuitively there should be none (Rinard, 2017) 10.
9A function in the set is an admissible precisification, whereas a function not in the set is an inadmissible
precisification of your doxastic state (Rinard, 2017).
10For a survey of failed attempts to escape this problem see Rinard (2017)
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7.4.3 Real-valued suspension of belief?
The final objection to CBL we will address is that it cannot account for suspended belief.
The reason for this is that credence is simply not the right sort of stuff to make for such
an attitude. Sturgeon’s Force-based Lockeanism does a better job at suspended belief,
but it cannot do so with point-valued confidence as a resource. As we saw, point-valued
confidence makes for disbelief and belief, but suspended belief is a stable configuration
of cognitive force that involved neutrality, and hence it is not point-valued (Sturgeon,
2020).
What would be a permissible credence for a proposition p for which we had no evidence
to judge whether p? If we found ourselves in a situation of absence of any information
pertaining to the truth or falsity of p. Under such circumstances, the traditional picture
would have it that we suspended belief about the target proposition. I will show that
there is no credence one can take that resembles what we call ‘suspended judgement’.
CBL cashes out disbelief, belief and suspension of belief as low, high, and middling
credence, respectively, where these are all contextually variable. One might think that
all that is not believed is either disbelieved or an attitude of suspended belief. If one does
not lend credence above the belief-threshold or below the threshold for disbelief in p one
is said to be suspending belief on CBL. We should not find this picture satisfactory.
As we saw, failing to believe both members of a pair of propositions p and ¬p is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for some attitude to be suspension of belief.
There is the further requirement that one is taking some stand towards p that is neither
belief nor disbelief; considered agnosticism about the truth of p. Those that see some
intimate link between the belief-like attitudes and rationality also recognize this, and
Friedman (2013) argues that we are subject to an absence of evidence norm, that permits
one to suspend judgement about a class of propositions she calls ordinary contingent
propositions.
The ordinary contingent propositions are a class of propositions that describe mundane
statements of facts about the world that are possibly true. An agent S has no semantic
guarantee of the truth of any p, and further, no information pertaining to the truth of
a given p (Friedman, 2013). For this restricted class of propositions, there is simply no
evidence for S to base her lending of credence to p. In probabilistic terms: Assume that
S has some credence Cr(·) for p, upon considering any evidence for or against p, S’s
credence in p has not swayed (because she has none). I would also include propositions
for which S has some evidence for or against p, but where there is not enough evidence
to decide whether p or ¬p in the class of propositions for which one was epistemically
permitted to suspend belief, but this is not necessary for the argument to go through.
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On CBL, one suspends belief by lending credence in a subinterval of [0,1]. Let us stipulate
that the belief-threshold and the disbelief threshold is .75 and .25 so that we have the
belief and disbelief sub-intervals [.75,1] and [0,.25]. The suspension of belief sub-interval
is then (.25,.75). We thus have:
Sus: S suspends about p at t iff CS(p) ∈ (.25, .75) at t
The absence of evidence norm epistemically permits that we do not lend credence to
propositions for which we have no evidence. Arguably, we are also permitted to suspend
about conjunctions and disjunctions of ordinary contingent propositions. For this ex-
ample, let us say that we are permitted to suspend about propositions p1 − pn. As we
have no information about the propositions — no evidence pertaining to their truth or
otherwise — we also have no grounds to think that they are probabilistically dependent,
and so CS(p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ... ∧ pn) ought to equal CS(p1)CS(p2)...CS(pn), i.e., we treat them as
probabilistically independent (Friedman, 2013).
Let’s say we are concerned with propositions p1−p5. Let us further say that our credence
in any p among them is CS(pi) = 0.5, that is, as ‘undecided’ about any p as you can get
with credence. Then Cs(
∧5
i=1 pi) ought to be .03125. In the case of our suspended belief
sub-interval Sus we see that if we permit suspension of conjunctions and disjunctions of
ordinary contingent propositions, and we are concerned with just five propositions Sus
would be false for any combination of credence in the (0.25,0.75) interval11. This means
that suspension of belief cannot just be lending credence. The same reasoning extends
to larger conjunctions, such that the only interval that could represent suspension would
be (0,1)12 (Friedman, 2013).
Credence does a poor job of representing suspension of belief. Lending middling credence
— credence that is not either sufficiently high or sufficiently low — cannot be the same as
suspension of belief. The paradigm case of suspension of belief by way of lending credence
would be one of .50 credence, which is exactly middling credence — as far from perfect
disbelief and belief as one could get — but this will not do. One is decidedly taking a
stand towards the truth of some claim if one’s strength of belief in that claim is exactly
.5 credence. Suspended belief is however tantamount to not taking a stand on the truth
of p, to take an attitude of agnosticism about p (Sturgeon, 2020, pp.286-287).
11With CS(pi) = 0.5 it would be false with the conjunction of just three propositions.




The reasons for preferring confidence to credence in a threshold view of belief is found in
credences lack of psychological plausibility, its poor performance with regard to account-
ing for suspension of belief, and in the many situations in which a point-valued epistemic
attitude is not possible nor rational in relation to the evidence one is presented with. We
saw that the worry that evidence permits or requires one to take an interval-valued atti-
tude has led to credence-first accounts couched in terms of credal sets. This changed the
problem of a point-valued attitude being too granular to one where you have too granular
endpoints of the interval. This cannot be overcome by insisting on a supervaluationist
or similar approach to sets, because higher-order vagueness is not vague in the intended
sense (see e.g. Lyon, 2017; Rinard, 2017).
Any view that does not take belief and disbelief to be credence 1 and 0 cannot account for
suspended belief. There is no way to appropriately represent the attitude of a considered
reserve as to whether p with an attitude that is the paragon of precision. However,
non-threshold accounts suffer from problems as well, as we saw. We are therefore in the
peculiar position where any plausible account that grounds belief in credence will have to
be a threshold account. At the same time, it cannot be a threshold account in the sense
that the threshold for belief is < 1 if it is to account for suspended belief.
In the next chapter, I will introduce my own take on belief. I will show Sturgeon gets his
description of our believings right to a large extent, but diagnose why confidence does
not make for attitudes with unit-real and interval-valued precision. It is not that we are
missing a piece of the puzzle, but rather that we have too many.
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8 Simple force-based Lockeanism
Giving an account of belief in terms of credence and credal sets, and attitudes that
are functionally identical to these, is problematic when giving an account of the belief-
like attitudes had by human persons. They are too fine-grained and hyper-precise to
ground our coarse attitudes. The reverse is true of belief-first approaches. They rely on
attitudes that are too coarse-grained, and therefore cannot encode information about the
confidence we lend to claims in a way that answers to our intuitions about our attitudes.
However, we do not have to restrict ourselves to either attitude when describing what
our psychological ontology is populated with; it is likely populated not by credence nor
outright belief. In simple confidences we find a happy medium; fine enough to make sense
of all our practices involving belief, but so coarse as to not place any undue burden on
our psychology.
In the following sections, I will discuss why it is that both belief-first and credence-first
views provide incorrect descriptions of our belief-like attitudes, and the relation that
exists between our attitudinal spaces. The main reason for this is that they are locked in
a stalemate between accuracy and specificity in descriptions of our doxastic affairs. With
this stalemate as backdrop, finding a trade-off that retains as much specificity as possible
in the attitude we ground our coarse attitudes in is the focus of the rest of this chapter.
I will show that the resulting attitude can report any doxastic situation with absolute
accuracy.
My view is in large part inspired by Sturgeon’s (2020) confidence-view of believings. I
think that his approach to our belief-like attitudes is sound; coarse-grained attitudes
are grounded in confidence. I am however sceptical about the prospects of cognitive
forces combining such that they make for credence and credal sets. Rather than making
accommodations for attitudes that model well for the purpose of engaging in theorizing
about normative requirements on rational belief, a descriptive theory of the belief-like
attitudes had by human persons should be furnished only by attitudes that find home in
our psychological ontology. Therefore, my critique of Sturgeon’s theory builds upon the
critique of CBL, and amounts to removing the objectionable real-valued elements, while
leaving the rest of his framework intact.
To excise the unit-real and the interval-valued confidences from Sturgeons framework,
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we must offer an alternative story as to why it is that we at times seem to have the
evidential grounds that could have our cognitive forces combine such that they make for
credence, and fail to manifest such an attitude. It is not that we must fail to do so,
but that there is an alternative, and psychologically less taxing, explanation at hand for
what goes on in ‘credal-making’ evidential situations. As in the case of credence-first
views, point-valued confidence and sharp thick confidence appear to be idealizations,
more so than descriptions of actual attitudes had by human persons. For this reason, I
will present a simple force-based view, which sees the coarse-grained attitudes reduced
to simple confidence.
8.1 Specificity, accuracy and evidence.
Belief-first views reports an agents S’s belief in p with absolute accuracy: You are said to
‘believe’ in all and only those instances in which you believe. Similarly, you are reported
as ‘disbelieving’ in all and only those instances in which you disbelieve, and ‘suspend
belief’ only when you suspend belief. These views remain silent on whether S believes a
proposition p more strongly than q, or is more confident in p than q, and other similar
cases. S can be represented as believing, disbelieving or suspending belief in p, and the
tripartite model can represent nothing else. Clearly, an adequate account of our attitudes
must be able to do this.
The converse holds of views that take the attitude of credence to be metaphysically
fundamental. Credence-first views are maximally specific: you can discern between your
degrees of belief with absolute precision; they can reflect ‘[...] even the subtlest difference
in confidence’ (Rinard, 2017). But, a theory that takes credence to be metaphysically
fundamental cannot account for every doxastic situation we find ourselves in.
For the reasons we went over in chapter 6., attempts to ground credence in belief, and so
to ‘incorporate’ specificity in belief first views does not work. Even on an account such
as Belief first, where notions of confidence is built into the content of what is believed
by appealing to epistemic modals, we cannot recognize that two agents may take an
attitude that is different, strength-wise, towards the same proposition. The proposition
might even have the same content and Mp structure, as we will make much of in following
sections. The attitude that relates a subject to an object of belief on the categorical view
encodes no more information than that some agent believes that p. In chapter 7. we
saw that credence-first views can do a better job at integrating our attitudinal spaces by
grounding our attitudes in credence. We could not however account for suspended belief,
nor the countless situations in which neither credence nor credal sets are appropriate on
the evidence we are presented with.
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This brings us to something of an impasse: Belief-first views cannot adequately account
for why we do and say that we believe some things more strongly than others, nor make
much sense of differing attitudinal strengths. Views that rely on credence or point-valued
confidence are hyper-precise, and unlikely to find home in the psychology of human per-
sons. Given the doxastic tools of outright belief and credence, we can have either accuracy
or specificity, but we cannot have both. This trade-off is in-principle unavoidable; you
are either committed to hyper-precision in our attitudes where intuitively none ought to
be found, or you must rely on attitudes that are too blunt specificity-wise to make sense
of many of our practices involving belief (Rinard, 2017).
The push to construct a theory of belief resorting to either a categorical or a quantitative
and hyper-precise attitude such as credence is more strongly felt if one sees the functional
role of belief as one aiming at truth (or accuracy) or one guiding or producing behaviour.
In the case of categorical belief, the dicta to ‘Seek truth!’ and ‘Shun error!’ (James,
1979) foists an all-or-nothing take on claims on us (Easwaran, 2017). This has recently
been re-interpreted by Bayesians as seeking to have the most accurate doxastic picture
of the world, which many take to provide some fundamental epistemic good. A hyper-
precise attitude lends itself to such an analysis (Easwaran, 2017; Horgan, 2017). Both
attitudinal kinds have been put in service of reasoning about normative requirements on
ideal rationality.
The takeaway is that if you identify the functional role of belief with some static or
downstream role, and want the attitude of belief to serve a specific role in reasoning
about rationality, both the categorical and the credal conception of belief have their
place. This does not point to their being psychologically real kinds, however, and I see
no reason why we must be locked in this stalemate between an outright and a credal
conception of our attitudes. With the function of belief identified with an upstream role,
we will see that our attitudes should come with a range of precisification to match the
evidence we are routinely faced with.
This is Sturgeon’s (2020) take. He tries to have it both ways in the stalemate between
accuracy and specificity: By appeal to confidence, we have an attitude that can at times
exhibit unit-real or interval-valued precision, but at other times can come in proportions
of cognitive force that make for vague thick confidence. His view can accommodate,
specificity-wise, the sort of attitudes that model well, and those that do not. Confidences
therefore run the whole gamut of specificity, where it can at times be hyper-precise, and
at others be essentially vague, all as a function of our interaction with evidence.
This offers a much more pleasing story of how our attitudinal spaces are related than
credence-first views. On FBL it is the nature of the evidence we are presented with that
determines how ‘vague’ of an attitude we take towards a proposition. When evidence is
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Credence
Precise Imprecise
Credal sets Simple confidences
Figure 7: Precisification
such that we can take an attitude that embodies a fair bit of precision, we do so. When
it is such that little precision can be found, we take an attitude that reflects just that.
When our confidences are such threshold-wise that they make for belief, we are said to
believe, and so on. That is to say, that we report our attitudes with accuracy while
retaining specificity.
8.1.1 Hopes dashed through.
What Sturgeon recognizes, but his theory does not, is that by weaving point-valued and
interval-valued attitudes into his framework and thus gaining access to an attitudinal
repertoire that can model well, he re-introduces many of the same worries we have seen
with credence. For the most part, philosophers take credence to be mere idealization, but
useful ones nonetheless. They can supposedly shed considerable light on ideal rationality,
and some see the normative requirements on rationality to provide epistemic ideals for
human persons to strive for. But, as Horgan (2017) asks, are Bayesians:
‘[...] basically just simplifying the pertinent realities of human psychology in an idealizing
way, and in one that one knows is retaining all but minor and negligible psychological
factors that are pertinent to epistemic rationality?’
His answer is a resounding ‘No’. Far from resorting to innocuous idealization, building a
view of belief on credence in order to then use the attitude to draw up the contours of what
it is to be rational is at the same time to construct a theory of belief out of a psychological
fiction (Horgan, 2017). Credence is not relevantly similar to whatever attitude we take
to inhabit our psyontology. We should not find attitudes that are functionally identical
to credence to be more than idealizations, either.
Unlike what many in this debate holds, Sturgeon (2020) sees point-valued and interval-
valued attitudes as psychologically real kinds. It is not that we do not recognize that
we engage in idealization of our attitudes to have them fit in some formal model most
of the time: Human persons are for the most part not capable of being in the way such
idealizations require from our psychology. If our everyday interactions with claims and
evidence made for such attitudes, we would have to have capacities we do not. But,
when the evidential circumstances are just right we can manage to take attitudes with
this precision, he claims.
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This is my central point of contention with his theory. In saying that point-valued
confidences are idealizations, we are also saying that they are at some remove from our
actual attitudes (Horgan, 2017). As such, they have no place on my theory. In the next
section, we will see what Sturgeon gets wrong about our believings, and how to set it
right. Belief is seen as a function of responsiveness to evidence. Quotidian evidence
embodies nothing of the precision of the sort required for taking an attitude of credence
most of the time. This datum, coupled with a better explanation of the sort of attitudes
we do take in credal-making scenarios, should give us reason to abandon the hopes of
cognitive forces making for point-valued attitudes altogether. Confidence is simple, and
simpler than Sturgeon would have it.
8.2 The right in the wrong
In many, perhaps most evidential situations, we rationalize a take on things that is coarser
than credence. We do not take this to be a defect in our attitudes and are happy to say
that we are more confident in P than in Q without being able to state our confidence
in either with anything like unit-real precision. Sturgeon (2020) sees the fundamental
functional role of belief to be a sort of responsiveness to evidence. It is in interaction
with evidence, or epistemic reasons for or against claims that cognitive forces exact their
push or pull on us, or leave us neutral with regard to the truth of claims. He maintains
that some evidential situations are such that we can take attitudes like credence and
credal sets. We will call this sort of situation a credal-making situation.
Even though we may encounter them with some frequency, there is an alternative ex-
planation for the sort of attitudes we take when evidence could make for a hyper-precise
attitude. With such an explanation at hand, we can remove point-valued confidence and
sharp thick confidence from his framework. This alternative explanation relies only on
attitudes that are more plausibly realizable by human persons.
Central to Sturgeon’s (2020) reasoning behind the claim that human persons take at-
titudes with unit-real precision is the norm of Character Match; we should match our
attitudes to our evidence. In investigating the specificity our attitudes should come with,
philosophical thought experiments appeal to situations in which we have the evidential
grounds for credence, and credal-making situations are relatively commonplace in the
literature (see e.g. Buchak, 2014; Christensen, 2004; Friedman, 2013; Sturgeon, 2008).
What these scenarios all have in common is that they are all concerned with statements
somehow involving probability (see Buchak, 2014; Lyon, 2017; Sturgeon, 2008). Buchak
(2014) discusses two types of credal-making situations philosophers appeal to: Objective-
chance propositions, and epistemic-chance propositions. The former refers to propositions
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that describe scenarios where the probability of a given outcome is known relative to some
fixed background. One such proposition could be ‘the chance the coin will land heads is
.5’. Epistemic chance propositions refer to propositions that somehow involve evidence
we have for the truth of some claim, e.g., ‘The Pfizer vaccine is 88% effective at protecting
me against infection by the Delta variety of the Novel Coronavirus’.
Sturgeon (2020) takes this line about credal-making situations. On his view, credence and
credal sets are real mental kinds. He makes explicit that his theory does not postulate
any mental kinds for the purposes of engaging in theorizing about normativity, and he
takes these hyper-precise attitudes to be ‘[...] part of an agent’s empirical endowment’
(Sturgeon, 2020, p.66). In interaction with our epistemic reasons for or against a given
claim, our evidence permits or requires that we take an attitude that is exactly n percent
certainty-wise. When evidence is such that it can make for a point-valued attitude, we
may manage to actually take such an attitude.
When we toss a coin the reasoning goes, we can take an attitude of .5 confidence in the
proposition ‘the coin will land heads’ (or tails) if we know that the coin is unbiased.
Similarly, for (fair) dice rolls, we could take an attitude of 1
6
confidence that you will
roll a five. Other scenarios are easily constructed, such as a ball game where you are to
pick a red ball at random from a box that contains say 100 balls, some exact proportion
of which is red, and some is blue and so on (see Buchak, 2014; Lyon, 2017; Sturgeon,
2020). As we saw, the variations on Weather report proceeded along the lines that
these thought experiments usually do.
We should see a problem with such a picture. On Sturgeon’s (2020) account, instead
of simply taking an attitude embodying real-valued precision, we are now reliant on the
possibility of cognitive forces coming together in a hyper-precise blend of pro and con
cognitive force. To generate point-valued confidence, they must be such that they come in
exactly n proportion of attraction, m proportion repulsion, and 0 proportion neutrality,
where n and m must be real-numbered and sum to unity. Cognitive forces are the result
of evidential push, pull, or neutrality, and we are to assume that for any claim C for
which you lend point-valued confidence, the evidential reasons you have for C would give
rise to say exactly 40% attraction, 60% repulsion and 0 neutrality if you are to lend .4
point-valued confidence to some claim. Is it plausible that our evidence makes for these
hyper-precise blends?
8.2.1 Confidence lent to Mp
My alternative explanation of the attitudinal goings-on in credal-making situations begin
by noting that these sorts of evidential situations are exceptions, rather than the rule:
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We can produce hyper-precise evidential scenarios in our thought experiments, but for
every credal-making situation we can create a non-credal-making variety on the setup:
A mystery coin with an unknown imbalance1, unfair dice, vague weather reports etc.
According to the norm of Character Match, point-valued attitudes are not appropriate
in these scenarios (see Lyon, 2017; Sturgeon, 2008). Furthermore, upon consideration,
we see that the evidence we are presented with for most claims is vague; at times it
shades precision-wise into evidence that could make for attitudes where some percentage
could be stipulated to represent our attitudes, but we realize that it is mere stipulation.
Utterances such as ‘I am 90 % confident it will rain tomorrow’ is as good as ‘I am 89 %
confident it will rain tomorrow’ in communicating to others that the confidence we lend
to the claim that it will rain is qualitatively quite or very high.
There is a simple confidence-account of why we at times have the evidential grounds to
manifest attitudes like credence, yet fail to do so: If the weather report states that the
chance of rain is exactly 70%, rather than evidence making for a mixture of cognitive force
that consists of exactly 70 % pro and 30% con cognitive force, we could simply lend near
maximal confidence to the proposition ‘the chance of rain is 70%’. Rather than being
.5 confident of a coin landing heads, we could be near maximally confident in the claim
that it would land either heads or tails, or near maximally confident in the proposition
‘the chance of the coin landing heads is 50%.’
To see the intuitive appeal of such an approach, consider a die roll. On Sturgeon’s picture,
you could lend point-valued confidence of 1
6
to the claim ‘you will roll a two’. You have
the evidential grounds to do so, and it could make for a mixture of cognitive force 1
6
of
which was pro, and 5
6
of which was con. You would therefore be only slightly confident,
and you could disbelieve the claim that the dice would end up on a two if the threshold
for disbelief in that context was > 1
6
. However, you could just as well be near maximally
confident in the proposition ‘the chance of rolling a two is 1
6
’ or some similar proposition
that captured the relevant probabilities in this scenario.
To strengthen the intuitive appeal of this alternative approach, consider again THE
EVER SO SLIGHTLY UNFAIR COIN. On Sturgeon’s theory, upon knowing that
the probability that it would land heads was .5123, this should make for an attitudinal
blend of .5123 pro and .4987 con cognitive force, with no neutral force. We could stipulate
a situation in which evidence was such that there was a ‘point-something’ chance of some
outcome, followed by a large or unending number of decimals2, and we should have no
problem with this if it was the case that we were capable of taking an attitude like point-
valued confidence. However, we are likely not. My alternative explanation — lending near
1Some would take the credence made in a coin with an unknown imbalance to require that we take an
attitude of .5 credence nonetheless, as this is in accord with the ‘Principal Principle’ (Carr, 2019).
2Which it is in the case of dice rolls.
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maximal confidence to a proposition describing the ‘probabilistic setup’ of the scenario
— should be more appealing.
We have already seen a view that proceeds along these lines. On Belief first you lend
confidence by believing a proposition outright, where the proposition involves an epi-
stemic modal; a belief of the form Mp. On my alternative explanation of why evidential
situations at times seems to make for an attitude like credence on Sturgeon’s picture,
you instead lend confidence to a proposition, the content of which is Mp, where M is the
epistemic modal in question — ‘it is 50% likely...’ for coin tosses and so on — and p
simply is whatever the ‘non-modal part’ of the proposition is, in this case ‘...that the coin
will land heads’. In the case of a rolling a two on a fair dice, imposing the structure S A
that p, would then look something like: An agent S lends near maximal confidence [the
attitude] that ‘the chance of rolling a two on a fair dice is 1
6
’ [the proposition] is true.
This has more advantages than merely giving account of what attitude we take in credal-
making scenarios. We at times lend confidences that differ ‘strength-wise’ to propositions
involving epistemic modals. I could be reasonably certain that Mp, whereas you might
just be somewhat certain of the same proposition. If I was more trusting of the weather
report than you, I could lend near maximal confidence to their claim that the chance of
rain tomorrow was 70%, whereas you could be more hesitant in their capabilities. This
could in turn make for me having a belief that the chance of rain tomorrow was 70 % if
the confidences in question fell in the belief-bracket of confidence relative to the context.
You in turn could, by that same token, end up suspending belief in the proposition.
What we would share was that neither of us lent precisely n-level confidence to the propos-
ition, but instead lent simple confidence to the proposition Mp. This opens the possibility
of responding differently to the same body of evidence, i.e., licensing permissivism about
evidence. Whether we ought to be permissivist about evidence is a debate that is beyond
the scope of this thesis, but that we are at times responding differently to the same body
of evidence seems to me a datum of the everyday.
In sum, many, perhaps most evidential situations are not such that a point-valued atti-
tude is appropriate given the character of our evidence (Sturgeon, 2020, p.270). We are
required to take an attitude that is more granular than credence. The above alternative
— an attitude of simple confidence lent to Mp — should be a viable explanation as to
why we at times have the evidential grounds to lend point-valued confidence, and fail to
do so.
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8.3 Simple force-based Lockeanism
I will show that a description of our belief-like attitudes appealing to simple confidence
offers a pleasing story of our attitudinal ontology, and the metaphysical integration of
our attitudinal spaces. First, we will consider how my view differs from Sturgeon’s. We
will then show how most of Sturgeon’s framework carries over even to a view that sees no
place for attitudes that model well. The force-based framework, which sees confidences as
cognitive forces coming together as a result of our interaction with evidence remains the
same, as does the threshold connection to our coarse-grained attitudes; simple confidences
fold neatly into a Lockean scheme on which our coarse grained attitudes are determinates
of the determinable confidence.
Working by elimination, we have ruled out several of the candidates for descriptions of
our attitudes argued for in the debate. We have seen more right in the fine view than the
coarse view, but a Belief first approach to the content we lend confidence to in credal-
making situations coupled with an attitude of simple confidence lent to that content offers
a more pleasing story of what goes on in these scenarios.
8.3.1 Of hyper-precise blends.
The substantial difference between our accounts is that mine admits of no real-valued
attitudes; we do not rationalize a hyper-precise attitude on our evidence, no matter how
precise an attitude the body of evidence we are presented with could make for. At
root, there is only one attitude, that of simple confidence. At times, it can take on some
specificity, but for the most part it will not. I take it that for most of our interactions with
evidence, we operate with qualitative rather than quantitative descriptive or comparative
categories: ‘I am more confident in p than in q’, ‘You are not very confident in z are
you?’, ‘I am torn between p or ¬p, and see no reason that either should be the case’, ‘I
am reasonably certain that p ∧ q’, and so on.
Sturgeon (2020) argues that the functional thrust of essentially vague confidence may be
weaker than that of the hyper-precise credence, meaning that we might not want to opt
for a theory that does not appeal to such mental states. I am not sure that this is the
case: For one thing, we appear not to lend credence at all, so it is hard to tell what the
functional thrust of credence actually is. The functional trust of lending near maximal
confidence to some proposition with content on the form Mp appears to be every bit as
strong as the functional thrust of any belief-like attitude can get. Furthermore, it does
not commit us to taking an ‘[...] exact spread of confidence across every niche of epistemic
possibility’ (Sturgeon, 2020, p.67), nor to taking intervals with sharp boundaries of same.
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Contrary to Sturgeon’s view that our common sense recognizes attitudes like this as
aspects of the ‘[...] central plank of the manifest (or ordinary, or everyday) image of mind’
(2020, p.67), my theory sees no place for hyper-precise attitudes. They are psychological
(but often useful) fictions. It is not the case that a person lending .95 credence to
some proposition is discriminable from someone who lends .951 or .949 credence to the
same proposition by their behaviour. Nor could we discriminate introspectively between
attitudes that were exactly n-wise from attitudes that were exactly m-wise, if n and m
were in close proximity on the real line, if such attitudes could exist at all in human
persons. Encountering evidence that makes for real-valued combinations of cognitive
force appear to be rare if existent at all.
In sum: My view is basically FBL, stripped of its real-valued attitudes, to paraphrase
Sturgeon (2010). The next sections will show the details of my view, and furthermore
that there is a great deal of good news associated with such an account.
8.3.2 Belief with a Hum(e)an face.
Mine is a force-based threshold view, and its core is described well in what has been
called the Humean thesis on belief (see Leitgeb, 2017):
an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction,
not in the nature or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being
conceived . . . An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea,
that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to
explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity . . . (Treatise, section VII,
part III, book I, Hume, 2014)3
On such a picture, our fine-grained attitudes are nothing but combinations of cognitive
force, and the coarse-grained attitudes stand to those attitudes as determinates. This is
the same as the general framework of Sturgeon’s (2020) theory: Cognitive forces combine
to make for confidences, our coarse-grained attitudes are determinates of those confid-
ences.
Those that fall within the belief-spread of confidence, i.e., meet the belief-threshold in
a given context have the determinate ‘belief’: Sufficiently strong confidence brought
about by the forces of attraction, repulsion and neutrality, in a stable and functionally
harmonious mixture of force dominated by attraction makes for belief. When cognitive
forces come together in this way, we say that we ‘believe’, and believing is one way to
instantiate simple confidence that falls at or above the threshold for ‘belief’ in a given
3The ellipsis points belong to Leitgeb (2017, p.67)
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context. When we say that we ‘believe that p’ the attitude we are taking is one of simple
confidence somewhere in the belief-spread of confidence, and this attitude is in turn a
consequence of our interaction with evidence making for mixtures of force.
Those that fall in the disbelief-spread of confidence have the determinate ‘disbelief’. Suf-
ficiently weak confidence brought about in the same way as before, in a stable and func-
tionally harmonious configuration dominated by the cognitive force of repulsion, makes
for disbelief. ‘Disbelief’ is one way of instantiating weak or low simple confidence lent
to a claim, and only those simple confidences that fall below the anti-threshold of belief
relative to a context have the determinate ‘disbelief’. As before, it is the evidence we
have that makes for combinations of force, and it is cognitive forces that combine to make
for the attitude of disbelief.
Finally, those confidences that are sufficiently thick makes for ‘suspended belief’. The
thickness of confidence is determined by the proportion of neutral cognitive force relative
to pro and con forces, where thicker confidence has more neutrality. The vivacity of an
idea assented to, to borrow from Hume, is a result of these cognitive forces exacting a
push or pull on us when we interact with the epistemic reasons we have for the truth or
falsity of a given claim. If neither the push nor pull is strong, we suspend about the claim,
under the assumption that we are not dealing with a dissonant mixture of cognitive force.
That is to say that all and only those confidences that are middling — neither strong
enough to meet the belief threshold, nor weak enough to fall below the anti-threshold —
have the determinate ‘suspended belief’. Unlike the pro or con forces, it is the lack of, or
vagueness in our evidence — the absence of effective epistemic reason it provides for or
against a claim — that makes for neutral cognitive force.
As our evidence is rarely such that we should expect to feel an exact n-wise push combined
with an exact n-wise pull ‘cognitive force-wise’, an essentially vague attitude makes sense
of how we rationalize a take on things better than credence or point-valued confidence.
Any vague attitude contains within it neutral cognitive force. However, it is not neutral
cognitive force that makes for a vague attitude, but the vagueness in the evidence we are
presented with. That is to say that all attitudes on my picture contain some element of
neutrality; none are point-valued as a consequence of containing within the functionally
stable mixture just pro or con cognitive force. Lending simple confidence to something like
propositions of the form Mp, accounts for our interaction with evidence in credal-making
situations in an intuitively more satisfactory way than taking an attitude of point-valued
confidence. With that in place, we have removed the idealizations Sturgeon makes in
their entirety.
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8.4 Verisimilitude
In this section, I will assess the simple confidence account of belief against the desiderata
set out in chapter 5. I take psyontological plausibility to be the most important of these,
but we will see that the simple confidence account has other attractive features besides.
Human persons likely cannot take an attitude of credence. As my account appeals only
to simple confidence, the sort that does not take any real-valued precision, no such attitu-
dinal precision is demanded from us. We have seen reason to think that our psychological
ontology is populated by an attitude like simple confidence, and we recognize that our
interactions with evidence rarely if ever makes for an attitude that is exactly n-wise. This
is a major advantage over credence-first views, and it is also an advantage over Sturgeon’s
theory, as it explains away the worry we saw with evidence making for point-valued con-
fidence.
Appealing only to an attitude that is coarser in grain than credence means that we are
sacrificing some attitudinal specificity, but we retain enough for our practices involving
belief; we have a ready explanation for why it is that we are said to believe some things
more strongly than others. Unlike credence-first views, a simple confidence view is also
absolutely accurate in describing our doxastic states, and it can offer a much more pleasing
story about suspended belief. The simple confidence model provides an account of the
metaphysical integration of our attitudinal spaces: It recognizes both coarse and fine-
grained attitudes, and takes to heart the datum that we have some attitudes that are like
belief, disbelief, and suspended belief, as well as some attitudes that are like confidence.
In recognizing this datum, my theory has an explanation of the marching-in-step phe-
nomenon. A successful theory of belief must be able to account for why our fine and
coarse attitudes do not come apart; in instantiating an attitude from one attitudinal
space, we also instantiate a counterpart in the other. My account does so by grounding
the coarse attitudes in their fine relatives, and at root only one attitude is found. We ar-
gued that dualism about our attitudes is not viable — we don’t lend high confidence and
disbelieve the same proposition for instance — and the simple confidence model reflects
that: Simple confidences stand to our coarse attitudes as determinable and determinates
respectively, and we have explanations for why it is we are highly confident when we say
we ‘believe’, and why we say we believe when we are highly confident. The same goes for
the confidence we lend in those cases in which we disbelieve or suspend belief.
With the simple confidence account, we can explain and predict the behaviour we see
in others by appeal to either coarse or fine states: That Jones goes to the fridge to
find leftover Chinese can be explained by his having a belief in the proposition ‘There
is Chow Mein in the fridge’. It can be explained equally well by his lending sufficiently
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strong simple confidence to that same proposition. The determinable-determinate con-
nection between our attitudinal spaces knits the coarse and fine attitudes together in a
theoretically pleasing way.
The simple confidence view also underwrites our talk of the attitudes. We are quite happy
to say of someone that they ‘believe that p’. With simple confidence, we now can make
sense of how someone ‘believes that p more strongly than q’, and also that someone ‘is
more confident in p than q.’ With the categorical conception of belief, we could not, as it
does not encode information about differing strengths of confidence lent to claims. With
credence-first views we could, but the precision came at a steep cost to psychological
plausibility and, in having to give up suspended belief on a credence-first view, to our
attitudinal repertoire.
The final advantage of the simple confidence model I will discuss is that it provides an
explanation for how interaction with epistemic reasons makes for our attitudes. As we
ponder a proposition p and weigh our evidence for and against the proposition, cognitive
forces exert their push, pull or neutrality on us. It is not that we blindly take a stand
towards some claim, but that we interact with our epistemic reasons when our take
towards claims is determined.
There is a ‘force-based layer of mental fact’ (Sturgeon, 2020, p.284) beneath the
confidence-theoretic layer of mental fact, and it does a much better job than credence-first
theories of showing how it is our interactions with evidence that ultimately makes for our
belief-like attitudes: All of those simple confidences that makes for an attitude of belief
by meeting the belief-threshold are sufficiently well-supported by the evidence such that
the cognitive force of attraction exerts a strong enough pull on us such that we would
assent when asked if we believed a proposition.
The different support from, and quality of evidence, we have for various claims is why
we come to have belief-like attitudes of various strengths and with different degrees of
precision. Our epistemic lives are shot through with quotidian evidence, offering support
or defeaters for claims. A simple confidence-view makes sense of how we rationalize a take
on things in a better way than any credence-first model can: As most of our evidence is
such that we ought to take an attitude that is finer in grain than that of outright belief,
but coarser (and more vague) than credence or credal sets allows for, simple confidences
present a pleasing description of the attitudes we actually take.
8.5 Denouement
We have seen that we have reasons to think that a force-based threshold-view of confidence
gets a lot right about our belief-like attitudes. In substituting credence for the essentially
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vague simple confidence, specificity is lost, but we retain enough that we can make sense
of our practices involving belief. Although their existence in the mind is ultimately
an empirical question, we enjoy great success at explaining where our confidences come
from, and furthermore that confidence can allow us to explain ourselves and others. The
explanatory work we can do with simple confidences, coupled with their psyontological
plausibility and relation to our everyday understanding of mind, are all reasons to endorse
a force-theoretic metaphysics of simple confidence. Sturgeon’s (2020) force-based view
of confidences is the first such view that has been developed. With my alterations, we
remove the objectionable elements of point-valued and interval-valued credence. We have
reason to think we get the ontology of our attitudes largely right, but as we will see, we
will pay significant hostages to fortune in our reasoning about rationality.
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9 Some troubles for my view.
This chapter will situate simple confidence within the normative schemes of full and
credal belief. I will then consider two objections to my view: The first is that confidence
simply does not make for belief; it is the wrong sort of stuff. The other has come to be
known as the ‘pointlessness objection’ (Stalnaker, 1984; Sturgeon, 2020, pp.266-267). If
we can describe all our doxastic affairs in terms of simple confidence, why then do we
posit a threshold connection between our coarse-grained and fine-grained states?
9.1 Epistemological implications
If the view of belief sketched in the previous chapter gives a correct description of our
attitudes, why am I concerned with the implications this has for our epistemology? Our
cue throughout has been to describe the belief-like attitudes had by human persons,
and rationality has been treated as a secondary concern. However, because normative
considerations have prompted different views of belief, and many see an intimate link
between our belief-like attitudes and the norms thought to operate on them, we ought
to provide some story of how confidences fit within the normative schemes of full and
degreed belief, if at all. We will see that simple confidence is too fine-grained for the
norms of full belief to apply, and it is too vague to attain anything like probabilistic
coherence.
Recall the purported norms of rationality of the full and credal variety as described in
chapter 4. Full belief is thought subject to a consistency norm and a closure norm,
what we will jointly call deductive cogency, whereas credences are considered subject
to a norm of probabilistic coherence. For the norms of rationality of full belief, we run
into the problem that confidences make for belief with sub-maximal certainty. In the
case of degreed belief, if we assume that epistemic goodness flows to those that have
probabilistically coherent sets of credence or confidence, and we further assume that
our attitudes can be represented by such sets, the question is what distance there is
between the map and the territory. What relation do the belief-like attitudes had by
human persons bear to their idealized counterparts in the formal machinery of Bayesian
epistemology?
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9.2 Deductive cogency
Confidences are fundamentally vague. They are not exactly n degrees strength-wise, and
they make for belief with a threshold less than certainty. The norms of deductive cogency
requires a categorical conception of belief; something ‘[...]over and above the agent’s
having a certain degree of confidence in the believed proposition’ (Christensen, 2004,
p.33). Assuming that simple confidences provide an accurate description of our attitudes,
the requirements that our beliefs be subject to norms of consistency and deductive closure
will have to be given up.
My view licenses belief in a set of inconsistent claims: Take the lottery example. Assume
it has 1000 tickets, and one winning ticket. Upon being told that this is the setup of
the lottery, you might be near maximally confident of any ticket that it did not win,
and certain that there is one winning ticket. Together these form an inconsistent set,
and on any reasonable interpretation of a contextually variable threshold, you are said
to believe contradictory claims. Confidences are not the sort of attitude to which a
norm of consistency can apply. Furthermore, as Christensen (2004, p.25) points out, we
will have to give up deductive closure. The claim that ‘no ticket will win’ in the lottery
follows deductively from propositions, each of which are believed on the simple confidence
account, about any given ticket not being a winner. However, the proposition that ‘no
ticket will win’ does not itself meet that threshold.
Could we still see some right in these norms that could apply to our confidences? The
Preface and Lottery paradoxes both suggests that the requirements of deductive cogency
are not right as they stand, but assume for now that they are an ideal to aspire to. If we
assume that they are such an ideal, then we can still draw an important lesson for what
it means to be rational on an everyday conception of rationality on a simple confidence
account. Belief in contradictory claims is seen as problematic because the claims can be
used to fashion a reductio ad absurdum argument against a believer. One shows that
someone is irrational by showing inconsistencies in her beliefs.
On our everyday conception of rationality, a contradiction in your set of beliefs is less
pressing if the set of beliefs you hold is large. Intuitively, one contradiction in a set
consisting of thousands of beliefs is not an egregious violation of the norms of outright
belief for an actual epistemic agent. Reductios drawn from a set with fewer members
are more powerful, and force a revision in attitude towards some member or members
of a small, inconsistent set of beliefs (Sturgeon, 2020, pp.263-265). We could still take
cogency-style constraints to operate on our simple confidences in this way, suggesting
that it may be the scope of, rather than the norms themselves, that go wrong (see e.g.
Littlejohn, 2015).
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9.3 Probabilistic coherence
With confidences being essentially vague, they are an unknown distance from whatever
nearest probability function defined over some algebra of propositions under consideration
there is available for us to take. To investigate if we held a dominated set of confidences,
we would have to stipulate some unit-real n confidence for each opinion in our opinion
set, but I see no principled way to go about such a stipulation.
Now imagine that we could go about forming credence. As we saw in the Tinkertoy case,
a set containing just a proposition and its negation gives us two possible outcomes to
which me must aportion our confidence. Assume that we were to go about this same
process, but include any proposition whatever that we had an opinion in. It would soon
become altogether too complicated, and so to give a reporting of our total doxastic state
seems prima facie impossible for agents with human capacities. This should surprise no-
one, and we should not be ashamed of falling short of perfection. We should however be
concerned if we take probabilistic coherence to be normative for us, as some do (Horgan,
2017).
Probabilistic coherence looks like a daunting norm to comply with, but it is in fact a very
weak norm for credal believings (Staffel, forthcoming). That your credence function must
be a probability function is in a sense the price of admission to the Bayesian epistemology
game. Add to that the further requirement that you are to update your credences by some
stripe of conditionalization, and the demands placed on rational agents on such a picture
becomes increasingly complex and beyond the reach of human persons1. Again, we see
that confidences do not fit neatly within a proposed normative scheme. The standard
reply to this problem has been that we ought to approximate the credal distributions of
ideally rational agents.
9.3.1 Bayesian approximations
According to those that take the function of belief to be aiming at the truth, accuracy
is an epistemic good that calls for promotion2. There is an assumption -tacit for the
most part- in the literature on rational degrees of belief, that human persons ought to
approximate the credences of ideally rational agents, and increasing attention is paid to
figuring out what benefits can be had by such approximation (see Easwaran, 2017; Hájek
& Lin, 2017; Jackson, 2020; Staffel, 2020; Sturgeon, 2019). The ‘approximation project’
is a relatively new field, and it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to describe it in any
1Conditionalization on its own is NP-hard (Staffel, forthcoming), meaning that it is suspected that
there are no polynomial-time algorithms for this class of problems. For our purposes, considering
conditionalization really hard should suffice
2A turn of phrase I have borrowed from Littlejohn, 2015.
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meaningful detail, but I will mention some central questions of this research in brief, as
it relates to my view.
The central assumption is that somehow epistemic good can accrue to those that are
better at such approximations. There is an important sense in which this might bring
epistemic benefit, and one in which it is less clear that this is so (see Staffel, 2020,
forthcoming): Imagine that you are an archer competing in the Olympics. You are to
hit a target consisting of 11 concentric circles, the outermost awarding 1 point, the one
inside it 2 points and so on (where the 11th circle serves as a tiebreaker in case more
competitors attain perfect scores). Barely missing the center will earn you nine points.
You may still be in the running for the top spot in the competition. If approximating
rationality is like this then there is clearly benefit to be had by being better at it than if
one is not.
In another important sense, it is not clear that approximation will give the same form
of epistemic benefit. Staffel (2020) gives an example of interviewing for a job. Normally
there will be a person that will be offered the job, and some ordering of the candidates
that will be next in line to get the offer should the preferred candidate decline for whatever
reason. In what sense, if any, is there benefit to be had from being ranked second if the
person offered the job accepts the offer? You are as close to getting the job as you could
be without getting the offer, but there is no clear sense in which this is beneficial to you.
As it stands, since our believings are not the sort of attitudes that can adhere neatly to
either probabilistic or deductive constraints, which they must, to count as ideally rational
on many accounts, then we should consider in what way these accounts are instructive.
We turn now to two objections to the simple confidence view.
9.4 Belief is not confidence
As Moon (2017) points out, it is not immediately clear that confidence which he takes
to be a notion that admits of degrees, and our lending more or less confidence to claims,
means that confidence is in any sense identical to beliefs. I agree that belief is not
confidence, but do not agree that confidence does not make for belief. He makes the
case that while some property of belief might come in degrees, beliefs themselves do not3.
3He makes the case that those that equate belief coming in degrees with lending confidence to some
claim, could do just as well with modified belief-ascriptions, such as believing some proposition p more
firmly than q (Moon, 2017). This does a fine job at respecting our talk of being more confident in some
claims than others, but it does not suffice as an explanation of why we are more confident in some
claims than others, as we saw in chapter 6: The attitude taken towards some content, and the degree
to which we are disposed to change our attitude towards that content are distinct mental phenomena.
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It could be that simple confidences are only belief-like seeing as they share some of the
properties had by what we would normally denote by ‘outright belief’. He takes those
that see belief as degreed to be committed to some thesis like:
Assumption 1: The property of having confidence that p is identical to the property of
having belief that p.
Assumption 2: ‘Belief’ and ‘confidence’ pick out the same thing.
From this, we supposedly infer that seeing as confidence comes in degrees, whatever has
the property of having confidence, or whatever is picked out by ‘confidence’ also comes
in degrees i.e., belief-having and confidence-having are identical properties or denote the
same phenomena. He then goes on to show that ‘belief’ is a determinable, but not
one that has determinates that are degree-ordered. Therefore belief cannot be degreed.
‘Belief’ do not meet what he calls the ‘degrees analysis’ (Moon, 2017, p.770):
Degres Analysis: X comes in degrees if and only if, possibly, there is some object O1
and some object O2 such that both O1 and O2 instantiate X, and O1 has more X
than O2 does.
A necessary condition for being a determinable that is degreed is that it has degree-
ordered determinates. On this account, a belief that p might have determinates such as
having a large degree of confidence that p, having almost no confidence that p and so on.
This means that ‘belief’ as such is not a determinate with degree-ordered determinates.
This is not inconsistent with my take on belief, because it gets things precisely back to
front.
Belief is not confidence, if by ‘belief’ we mean the attitude that is argued for by those
that see our belief-like attitudes as a categorical affair. However, on my account it is not
belief that is degree-ordered, but confidence that has ‘belief’ as a determinate. We are
not committed to the assumptions he makes for those that take belief to come in degrees,
because those that take a fine view do not see degree-of-belief, credences or any other
fine-grained attitude as belief as such (see Huber, 2009; Jeffrey, 1970; Pettigrew, 2016;
Sturgeon, 2008).
Lending sufficiently high confidence to p is one way of instantiating belief, and believing
is one way of instantiating high confidence, but neither is identical to belief as such, if
‘belief as such’ means outright belief as described on the categorical view. There is no
belief as such on my account, and ‘belief’ is a determinate that applies to a subset of
our simple confidences. By the Rationality of States-assumption, simple confidences have
all the belief-likeness we need for it to be singled from our other attitudes that are not
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belief-like. This may not be enough for those that see belief as a categorical affair, but as
we have already seen that what we mean by ‘belief’ cannot be this categorical conception,
simple confidences do a better job at answering to many of the intuitions we hold about
our attitudes.
9.5 The Pointlessness-objection
The final objection I will discuss is directed at Lockean views in general. It is called
the ‘pointlessness objection’. These views all posit that ‘belief’ is nothing more than a
fine-grained attitude that meets some threshold strength-wise. Once we fix facts about
our fine-grained attitudes, norms that operate on them already follow suit. Therefore,
if a certain kind of coarse state springs from confidence via a threshold, meeting some
threshold does not change the facts about an agent’s epistemic situation (Sturgeon, 2020,
p.266): The coarse-grained epistemic attitudes supposedly ‘come for free’ once the fine
attitudes are in place.
What good comes from calling all and only those confidences or credences that are at or
above a given threshold ‘belief’?4 Supposedly, all there is to say, or all that is needed
to say about an agent’s epistemic state can be said whenever one knows an agent’s
credences. This is a serious objection. Many Bayesians take it that all there is to be
said of an agent’s epistemic status is said when we state her credence function: With
the Bayesian approach to belief comes a fully furnished epistemology. The details of this
epistemology is yet to be fully specified, but an agent’s doxastic and epistemic state is
precisely and totally determined by her credences on the Bayesian picture.
The same cannot be said for simple confidences: Knowing one’s simple confidences does
not mean that the cogs of the Bayesian apparatus begin to turn, it is too coarse a
phenomenon for that. The norms for outright belief do not straightforwardly apply to the
attitudes singled out as ‘beliefs’ on my account either. There is no change in norms that
follows from calling those simple confidences that fall somewhere in the belief-bracket of
confidence ‘beliefs’. This objection therefore has less of a thrust when applied to simple
confidence as opposed to an attitude that comes with its own set of norms. Still, an
explanation is owed to those that see the threshold connection as pointless: If all there
is to be said about our epistemic status is said when stating our confidence, then it is
unclear what reason we have for singling out subsets of confidence as those making for
belief, suspended belief and disbelief.
4And ‘disbelief’ whenever once credence or confidence is below the antithreshold, and ‘suspended belief’
whenever it is middling in confidence or credence.
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A tentative answer to the pointlessness objector is found in practical considerations:
Appeal to coarse-grained states allow us to simplify our dealings with our attitudes. Much
like knowing someone is ‘tall’ relative to some context gives you information that knowing
just that someone is 186 cm may not, describing our simple confidences that are of high
strength as ‘beliefs’ may function as an important shorthand. We routinely chunk various
measurements into more manageable categories — for instance the threefold scheme big,
small, average — and the appeal to such categories is at times informative and useful in
its own right. This may have practical and epistemic significance. If asked to pick three
players for a basketball team, picking three that were ‘tall’ would be a lot simpler to do
than picking three that fell within some quite narrow acceptable range of centimetres of
height (Staffel, 2017; Sturgeon, 2020). The latter task is much more demanding, and, for
the purposes of playing basketball, not neccessary. It is at least possible that our appeal
to the coarse-grained attitudes serves a similar function in our doxastic lives.
There may also be cognitive importance to appealing to confidence by their coarse de-
terminates: You do not have to reflect on how confident you are in most of the things
you are said to believe. You simply believe them, i.e., lend them some high degree of
simple confidence. However, if you bring a given claim under consideration, you can
specify your degree of confidence with some precision. Having identified an intimate link
between evidence and belief-like attitudes, you can also point to how and what pieces of
evidence for or a given claim makes for the confidence you lend to the claim.
Furthermore, you may have some reason for why it is the case that your simple confidence
makes for belief in a given instance: You may have information regarding what evidential
or pragmatic considerations are such that a certain threshold seems appropriate in this
particular situation. That is to say that seeing as coarse-grained attitudes spring from
fine-grained attitudes via a threshold, you can likely say why this threshold is correct or
sufficient to make for say disbelief in a given instance.
Another important function of reporting confidences by appeal to coarse-grained states
is to report to others that whatever confidence you have is such that it makes for belief.
Rather than say that you are 98% certain in the truth of some claim, saying that you
‘believe it’ signals to others that you are confident enough to report your attitude as one
of belief. Similarly, that you ‘disbelieve’ a claim is simpler than stating that you lend it
low confidence and so on.
Together, these suggest that appeal to coarse-grained states has practical and cognitive
implications; they simplify our dealings with the attitudes in question (Staffel, 2017).
There is no change in norms when a kind of state springs from another via a threshold,
but there is more to be said about our attitudes than what epistemic status they have.
10 Upshots and conclusions
We have seen that belief is nothing but an attitude of simple confidence lent to a propos-
ition, that meets a vague and context-relative threshold. There is no belief simpliciter.
Our psychological ontology is populated by attitudes more fine-grained than outright be-
lief, but more vague than credence. An account that grounds our coarse states in simple
confidence — themselves a result of a combination of pro, con, and neutral cognitive force
— provides a pleasing story of how our attitudinal spaces are related.
In taking Sturgeon’s novel approach to belief, and removing the objectionable elements,
we can improve upon the competing descriptions of our belief-like attitudes. By locating
the ‘ultimate layer of attitude-generating mental fact’ (Sturgeon, 2020, p.284) in our
interaction with evidence, we have provided an explanation not only for the kind of
attitude we take, but also explained how we come to take belief-like attitudes; my view
situates human persons in the midsts of their epistemic circumstances
Simple confidence represent a happy medium between our two extremes of outright belief
and credence: It is specific enough to encode the information we need for our practices
involving belief-like attitudes, and it is absolutely accurate in describing our doxastic
affairs. My account explains away worries associated with those accounts that see reason
to abandon either our coarse or fine attitudes, and with those accounts that take these
attitudinal spaces to be entirely disconnected. We have some attitude like belief and some
attitude like degreed belief, and these march in step because the former is a determinate
of the latter.
There is more right in those accounts that place metaphysical priority on our fine atti-
tudes. However, we saw reason to sacrifice some specificity for the sake of psychological
plausibility: Our psychology is not such that we instantiate attitudes with unit-real pre-
cision, and my account reflects that our attitudes are essentially vague with regard to
the specificity they come with. As a consequence, our actual attitudes do not fit easily
within either canonical normative scheme. We get the ontology and metaphysics of belief
right, but at a cost to our epistemologies.
The ontology/epistemology-conflict raises some interesting questions: What distance are
we from being able to adhere to proposed norms for rationality on either the coarse or
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fine conception of belief, and in what sense do the norms carry normative force for us?
In the case of traditional epistemology, we should all be perturbed by the fact that few
in this debate see belief-first views as live options. If it is the case that we see a special
place for outright belief in our epistemology, and we do not take an attitude like outright
belief to propositions, then we ought also to draw out the implications of this mismatch
between our epistemological practices and our attitudinal metaphysics, for our analyses
involving belief-like attitudes.
If we have no way of being in the way required for being (ideally) rational on the Bayesian
picture — probabilistic coherence is the absolute minimal requirement for such rationality
— then what is the relationship ideal rationality bears to actual or everyday or common
rationality? If it turns out that epistemic benefit can be had by those who better ap-
proximate the credence functions of ideally rational agents, then providing the means by
which we could go about such approximations is an important area of research.
If you take it to be the case that an attitude of belief must be subject to either set of
norms in order to count as belief proper, then you are likely not going to find the view set
forth in this thesis appealing. However, we have seen that accounts that work backwards
from a proposed set of norms to a theory of belief, often provide incorrect or incomplete
descriptions of our actual attitudes. Starting from the nature of simple confidence and
working towards its rational constraints could therefore be conducive to the project of
working out what norms constrain the sort of attitudes had by actual epistemic agents.
How must human persons believe and configure their beliefs to count as rational?
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